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ALASKA'S NUISANCE STATUTE REVISITED: 
FEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS LIMITS TO 
COMMON LAW ABROGATION 
Jan Erik Hasselman* 
1. BACKDROP: SITKA, ALASKA: 1992-94 
The Alaska Pulp Corporation (APC) pulp mill in Sitka, Alaska was 
never an exemplar of environmentally sound management.! APC, 
which is owned by a consortium of Japanese corporations, ignored its 
own consultant's findings that the mill's proposed construction site in 
Silver Bay was particularly fragile, and proceeded with the lowest 
cost-and most environmentally destructive-waste and emissions 
discharge system available.2 Since beginning operations in 1959, the 
mill had been repeatedly cited by the EPA for violations of its Clean 
Water Act National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permit.3 Because of the mill's chronic inability to comply 
with its NPDES permit, the EPA in 1986 entered into a consent 
decree requiring APC's good faith efforts to move towards compli-
ance.4 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1996-97. 
1 See Plaintiff's Pretrial Memorandum at 1-6, Edwards v. Alaska Pulp Corp., (Alaska Super. 
Ct., Sept. 12, 1994) (No. 1S1-92-257 CI) [hereinafter Sept. 12 Memorandum] (on file with B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.). 
2 [d. at 3. 
a [d. at 4. 
4 United States v. Alaska Pulp Corp., No. CIV,A86-331, 1986 EPA Consent LEXIS 105, at 
*1. At one point, the EPA grew so weary of accepting fines from the company--essentially 
payments to continue to pollute-that the agency began returning them. See Sept. 12 Memo-
randum, supra note 1, at 5. The mill also operated under a consent order with the state 
Department of Environmental Conservation for repeated violations of state air standards. [d. 
at 6. 
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Local residents charged that the mill was causing the water quality 
in Sitka Sound to deteriorate aesthetically and ecologically, and com-
plained that foul odors and fumes interfered with the use of their 
property.5 Residents also charged that these problems resulted in a 
drop in property values and made property difficult to rent or sell.6 
In February, 1992, Sitka resident Larry Edwards filed a class action 
private nuisance suit on behalf of himself and 120 other landowners 
along the Sound.7 
In March, 1993, James Clark, the attorney for Alaska Pulp Corpo-
ration, Ltd. (APL is the parent company of APC), began promoting 
a remarkable legislative enactment designed to circumvent the Ed-
wards suit.8 Clark circulated a draft of a proposed statutory revision 
of Alaska's common law cause of action for nuisance to state repre-
sentatives and Alaska Attorney General Charles Cole. Under Clark's 
proposal, a discharge, emission, occupation, or structure could not be 
an actionable nuisance if it was licensed, permitted, or otherwise 
authorized by law.9 Despite serious questions raised as to the bill's 
constitutionality, proponents introduced the bill during the 1993 leg-
islative session.10 The following year, due in large measure to careful 
shepherding by Sitka's representative in the Alaska Senate, Robin 
Taylor,l1 the Alaska legislature passed the bill; Governor Walter 
"Wally" Hickel signed the bill into law in April, 1994.12 
5 Sept. 12 Memorandum, supra note 1, at 8-13. The Pretrial Memorandum cited a 1991 
Department of Environment and Conservation report that found that the mill was the source 
of toxic floating sludge, a darkening of the water, and toxics in sediments and fish tissue. I d. at 
8. It also cited a 1992 City of Sitka report which found the mill responsible for illegally high 
sulfur dioxide and particulate matter discharges. Id. at 9. Finally, it noted that the United States 
Forest Service confirmed that the health and diversity of lichens increased dramatically with 
increased distance from the mill, and that the ecological impacts were noticeable as far away as 
eleven miles from the mill. Id. 
6Id. at 10-12; see also Ian Mader, House Moves on Anti-lawsuit Bill, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Mar. 
21, 1994, at 3. 
7 See Sept. 12 Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1. 
S See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motions for Judgment on the 
Pleadings or Alternatively for Summary Judgment, at Exhibit 1, Edwards v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 
(Alaska Super. Ct., July 20,1994) (No. IS1-92-257 CI) [hereinafter July 20 Memoranduml (on 
file with B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.). 
9Id. 
I°Id. at 5. 
11 Senator Taylor's zealous advocacy on behalf of APC over the years had earned him the 
moniker "the Senator from APC." Telephone Interview with James McGowan, attorney for 
plaintiff Larry Edwards (Feb. 8, 1996) [hereinafter McGowan Interviewl. 
12 July 20 Memorandum, supra note 8, at 5. Alaska Statute § 09.45.230 (the final version of 
the bill which was passed) states in part: 
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Soon thereafter, APC's attorneys filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, arguing that the new law rendered the Edwards suit 
moot.I3 Edwards's attorneys responded that the statute was neither 
applicable-APC's actions were never in compliance with pollution 
regulations and hence were not protected by the statute-nor consti-
tutionaU4 The Alaska Superior Court agreed that the statute was 
unconstitutional as retroactively applied to the Edwards lawsuit and 
rejected the defendant's motion. I5 Moreover, rejecting the claim that 
the statute was a well-considered revision of the common law, the 
court found that an "important" purpose of the statute was spe-
cifically to circumvent the Edwards lawsuit against APC.I6 The court 
noted, however, that the statute could be read to extinguish future 
private nuisance claims.I7 
By the time the trial was scheduled to start, APC had closed down 
its Sitka mill, making the desired injunction against pollution dis-
charges irrelevant.I8 Consequently, the parties agreed to settle. APC 
A person may not maintain an action under this section based upon an air emission or 
water or solid waste discharge . . . where the emission or discharge was expressly 
authorized by and is not in violation of a term or condition of 
(1) a statute or regulation 
(2) a license, permit or order that is 
(A) issued after public hearing by the state or federal government; and 
(B) subject to 
(i) continuing compliance monitoring; 
(ii) periodic review by the issuing agency; 
(iii) renewal on a periodic basis; or 
(iv) AS 46.40; or 
(3) a court order or judgment. 
ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.230 (1995). 
13 See July 20 Memorandum, supra note 8, at 1-2. 
14 [d. at 2-3. Plaintiff's attorneys primarily based their challenge on the due process clause 
and interpreting case law of the Alaska Constitution. See id. 
15 See Edwards v. Alaska Pulp Corp., No. 1SI-92-257 CI, slip op. at 4 (Alaska Super. Ct., Sept. 
22, 1994) (memorandum and order addressing the constitutionality of Section 09.45.230.) [here-
inafter Sept. 22 Order]. The Alaska Superior Court noted that, under federal law, vested rights 
cannot be abridged by a statute that effectively takes away an accrued cause of action to enforce 
those rights. [d. at 2 (citing Greyhound Food Management, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 653 F. Supp. 
1297 (S.D. Ohio 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 866 (6th Cir. 1989)). Moreover, under the Alaska Constitu-
tion, an unlitigated claim is a property interest that cannot be taken away by government action 
without due process of law. [d. at 3 (citing Bush v. Reid, 526 P.2d 1215 (Alaska 1973)). It also 
represented an uncompensated taking of property. See id. at 2 (citing Wickwire v. City and 
Borough of Juneau, 557 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1976)). 
16 [d. at 4 n.6. 
17 [d. at 4. 
18 Naftali Bendavid, Edwards, et al. v. Alaska Pulp Corp., et al., LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 24, 1994, 
at 16. 
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set up a $2 million trust fund to improve the "quality of life" in Sitka, 
funding science classes and a community music festival. 19 
II. INTRODUCTION: STATUTORY REVISION OF COMMON LAW 
PROPERTY PROTECTIONS 
Senator Taylor and APL's rather ham-fisted attempt to circumvent 
a costly lawsuit failed.20 The story demonstrates, however, that pol-
luting industries successfully can weaken and even destroy tradition-
ally powerful common law protections by turning to sympathetic 
legislatures.21 Although the Alaska Superior Court held the law inap-
plicable to the Silver Bay landowners in the Edwards suit, the court 
still considered the law valid as applied prospectively, and at the 
present time every landowner in Alaska faces the prospect of serious 
property damage at the hands of polluting facilities without the op-
portunity for a remedy under a private nuisance claim.22 
Polluting industries in other states will probably find the story of 
Alaska's effort to override the common law in favor of pollution regu-
lation a useful and interesting model.23 With national and state legis-
latures today at times demonstrating an unusual sympathy for corpo-
rate and industrial concerns,24 other states also may attempt to 
abrogate traditional remedial mechanisms such as nuisance and neg-
ligence in favor of regulatory schemes.25 Future legislators, moreover, 
19Id. Although this article refers to the settlement as a "fairy tale" end to the divisive 
litigation, id., the story was far from over. See Jane Fritsch, EPA hears 'Hands Off' Alaska 
Pulp, THE COMMERCIAL ApPEAL (Memphis), Aug. 27,1995, at 7A. APC had left over a million 
pounds of dioxin and other toxin-laced fly ash at its abandoned mill site. Id. When the EPA 
began investigating it for Superfund listing, Alaska Senator Frank Murkowski attempted to 
prevent the listing. Id. 
20 See supra text accompanying notes 8--17. The fact that the statute was a blatantly obvious 
attempt to extinguish the Edwards lawsuit was not its only weakness. See ALASKA STAT. 
§ 09.45.230. Section 09.45.230 applied only to private nuisance, leaving open the possibility of 
creative efforts to circumvent the common law damages bar by using public nuisance, strict 
liability, trespass, or negligence claims. See id. 
21 See supra text accompanying notes 8-17; see also Sept. ZZ Order, supra note 15, at 4 ("The 
perception that a large corporation can go to the legislature and extinguish an existing property 
right belonging to a single individual has to be detrimental to the perception of the administra-
tion of justice."). 
22 See Sept. ZZ Order, supra note 15, at 4. 
23 See State Refryrm of Tort Laws Proceeds During Calls For Federal Intervention, U.S. LAW 
WEEK, May 24, 1995, at 1-18 [hereinafter State Reform of Tort Laws]. 
24 See generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future: Civic 
Values Confronting Market Force Dynamics in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 733 (1996). 
25 See State Reform of Tort Laws, supra note 23. 
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probably would draft common law override bills more comprehen-
sively than did the authors of Alaska's anti-nuisance statute.26 
This Comment contemplates a hypothetical state statute that ex-
tinguishes common law remedies for injuries caused by a discharge 
or emission, providing that the responsible facility is in compliance 
with pollution regulation or otherwise complies with the law.27 Unlike 
Section 09.45.230, however, this hypothetical statute would apply only 
prospectively and would abrogate the full range of common law reme-
dies, including public nuisance, trespass, strict liability, and negli-
gence. 
This Comment argues that a statutory abrogation of the common 
law that leaves property subject to uncompensable damage is an 
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty and property without due proc-
ess.28 In dOing so, this Comment bypasses the conventional view that 
substantive due process review is always completely deferential 
where a statute does not impinge upon a "fundamental" interest. 
Instead, this Comment argues that, where a statute deprives indi-
viduals of important common law protections and leaves them with 
no legal remedies for injuries caused by pollution, judicial scrutiny 
will be greater. Based on United States Supreme Court precedent, a 
court probably should find the hypothetical statute posited above to 
be unreasonable and arbitrary, and consequently violative of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
Section III of this Comment examines the need for common law 
property protections in light of the nature of pollution standards and 
regulations such as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. Section IV 
then briefly examines the history of substantive review of legislation 
under the Due Process Clause and traces the evolution of the current 
"two-tiered" standard of review. Section V demonstrates that, despite 
the deference typically due to economic regulation, the Supreme 
26 See supra note 20. 
27 The reason for examining the constitutionality of a non-existent statute is that something 
akin to the "hypothetical" posited above may become reality in the future. The shortcomings of 
Alaska's Section 09.45.230-retroactive application to existing suits, and application only to 
private nuisance-are quite obvious. Industry lawyers and lobbyists will easily conjure up a 
more airtight version of the same idea. 
28 See infra text accompanying notes 282-351. This comment focuses on substantive due 
process review of legislation. Other constitutional challenges to this hypothetical statute are 
promising as well, perhaps chief among them a "takings" challenge. The author of this Comment 
wrote a term paper on the takings challenge to Alaska's nuisance statute for an environmental 
law class. This paper is on file with BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
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Court examines common law abrogation and liability limitations with 
a significant quantum of scrutiny, and balances several factors to 
ensure that the common law change is fair and reasonable. Section VI 
posits some possible justifications for this implicit higher scrutiny by 
tracing various themes that run through the Court's constitutional 
jurisprudence. Finally, Section VII applies the multi-factor reason-
ableness balancing standard articulated in Section V to the hypotheti-
cal common law abrogation statute, and examines why the statute 
probably should fail. 
III. POLLUTION REGULATION: INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION 
FOR PROPERTY 
Statutory pollution regulation is not well designed to protect prop-
erty from damage associated with air and water emissions.29 Emis-
sions that are permissible under pollution regulations still can cause 
significant damage to individual property or the environment.30 More-
over, statutory pollution regulation generally does not provide for 
compensation for damages to private citizens caused by pollution.31 
Common law private actions thus provide a necessary complement to 
environmental regulations, one which the statutes themselves con-
template.32 Consequently, the abrogation of common law claims would 
leave property subject to damage that could not be compensated or 
remedied by any legal mechanism. 
As with any legislation, anti-pollution regulation usually represents 
a compromise between those who want rigorous environmental pro-
tection and those who insist that strict regulation would weaken 
industries and slow economic progress.33 Lobbyists for polluting in-
29 See infra text accompanying notes 33-47. This section is by no means meant as a compre-
hensive critique of pollution regulation. Rather, it is intended to demonstrate that the common 
law remains critically important for the protection of property from damage caused by pollution. 
30 See cases cited infra note 47. 
31 See infra text accompanying notes 39-42. 
32 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1994) (Clean Air Act) ("Nothing in this section shall restrict 
any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to 
seek enforcement of any emission standard or limitation or to seek any other relief .... "); 33 
U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1994) (Clean Water Act) (identical language to 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) except with 
"effluent" replacing the term "emission"); see also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 
481, 497 (1987) (noting that "savings clause" demonstrates that Clean Water Act is not meant 
to preempt state nuisance claims). 
33 See Robert McClure, This Year, Conserve is a Bad Word: Lobbyists for Environmental 
Groups Can't Get Any Major Legislation Passed, ORLANDO SENTINEL-TRIB., Apr. 2,1993, at 
B5. 
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dustries often have significant influence in the legislative process, and 
legislators are often loathe to implement strict environmental regula-
tions that could significantly impact economic competitiveness and 
employment.34 As a result, significant levels of pollution are still al-
lowed under virtually all regulatory regimes.35 
Second, regulatory pollution standards are by their nature broad 
prescriptions, applicable across a state or the entire nation.36 These 
standards attempt to articulate manageable ceilings on emissions to 
control pollution at the broadest level, and are poorly suited to deal 
with the myriad of individualized situations and local circumstances 
that render certain areas more susceptible to harm than others.37 
Local and individualized pollution control continues to rely on the 
common law, because the common law accounts for local standards of 
reasonableness that vary from place to place.38 
Furthermore, environmental regulations do not provide any 
mechanisms for individuals to secure compensation for individual per-
sonal or property damages.39 Instead, many regulations provide for 
citizen enforcement provisions,4° and explicitly retain common law 
remedies for damagesY Under current federal pollution regulations, 
common law actions provide the sole legal mechanism available to 
compensate individuals who have been damaged in some way by 
pollution.42 
34 Indeed, industry has frequently attempted to evade all responsibility for pollution, despite 
often overwhelming evidence to the contrary. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ET AL; ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 760 (1992) [hereinafter PLATER, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW] (noting that when regulators considered clean air problem in early 
1970s, automakers strenuously denied that cars contributed to smog). 
35 See id. at 774, 818. 
36 For example, the federal Clean Air Act establishes National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) applicable on a nationwide basis. See PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 34, 
at 773. 
37 Interview with Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, in 
Newton, MA (Nov. 16, 1995). 
38 See Scott C. Seiler, Comment, Federal Preemption of State Law Environmental Remedies 
after International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 49 LA. L. REV. 193, 194 nA (1988). 
39 See W. David Slawson, The Right to Protectionfrom Air Pollution, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 667, 
742 & 759-61 (1986). Professor Slawson notes that public regulation and private enforcement 
are both critically important, as each accomplish objectives the other cannot. [d. at 760. 
40 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Clean Water Act section allowing any individual to commence 
a civil action against persons in violation of the Act's provisions, or the state for failing to enforce 
the Act). 
41 See supra note 32. 
42 See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: Whats Worked; What's 
Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549, 1559-60 (1991). This is true even if the facility 
causing damage was in compliance with the regulations. See Water Pollution Control Act 
354 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:2 
Finally, pollution control regulations are heavily oriented towards 
the protection of human health, and much less oriented towards the 
protection of property and the environment.43 For example, the Clean 
Air Act is divided into primary standards, based on the protection on 
human health, and secondary standards, broadly based on the protec-
tion of "social welfare" but generally referring to effects of air pollu-
tion on materials, agriculture, ecosystems, and aesthetics.44 The pri-
mary standards are strict and generally well-enforced.45 Secondary 
standards-those most applicable to the protection of property-are 
not only less rigorous in substance, but generally have been enforced 
poorly.46 
Thus, pollution control regulations offer at best a slender quantum 
of protection to property. Even in heavily regulated industries and 
regions, the traditional mechanisms of the common law have remained 
necessary to control pollution levels in particular circumstances and 
to compensate for damages that occur.47 
IV. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW OF LEGISLATION 
Before examining why statutes that abrogate common law protec-
tions on private property should be subject to significant constitu-
tional scrutiny, a brief explanation of the Due Process Clause gener-
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3746-47 ("Compliance with re-
quirements under this act would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution dam-
ages."). 
43 See Samuel Hayes, Clean Air: From the 1970 Act to the 1977 Amendments, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 
33,35-36 (1978-79). 
44 [d. at 35. 
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 741O(a). This section requires primary standards to be met "as expeditiously 
as possible" but in no case later than three years after EPA approval. [d. 
46 Hayes, supra note 43, at 36. State implementation plans must only state a "reasonable time" 
in which the secondary standards will be attained. See PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra 
note 34, at 787-88. In practice, there has been little pressure to meet secondary standards. [d. 
47 Many states have explicitly ruled that facilities in compliance with pollution regulations can 
be liable for nuisance and other common law damages. See, e.g., Galaxy Carpet Mills, Inc. v. 
Massengill, 338 S.E.2d 428, 429--30 (Ga. 1986) (holding that carpet dye plant could be held liable 
in nuisance despite permit from Environmental Protection Division); Borland v. Sanders Lead 
Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 526-27 (Ala. 1979) (noting that compliance with state air pollution law did 
not shield lead recovery plant from trespass suit seeking damages caused by company's pollut-
ants). However, such a view is not universal. See New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 
30, 33 (2d. Cir. 1981) (noting that courts' reluctance to enjoin activities specifically authorized 
by legislatures is even greater where issue is technically complex and where Congress has 
granted administrative authority to an agency having technical expertise); Borough of Col-
legeville v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 105 A.2d 722, 731 (Pa. 1954) (a structure author-
ized by the legislature cannot be a nuisance). 
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ally and the evolution of the United States Supreme Court's substan-
tive review oflegislation may be instructive. This history is important 
in helping to explain why the elevated standard of review for common 
law abrogation has remained implicit.48 
Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment49 in 1868 in order to 
secure the protections of law for recently freed slaves.50 The Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to pro-
tect individuals from arbitrary or abusive exercises of state power 
and to prevent unreasonable government deprivations of liberty and 
property. 51 The original understanding of the Due Process Clause was 
procedural: to ensure that government utilized appropriate proce-
dures before depriving persons of life, liberty, or property.52 
Early on, the Supreme Court developed a substantive component 
of the Due Process Clause.53 According to the Court, certain govern-
ment deprivations are inherently violative of due process, regardless 
of the procedures used.54 In other words, the government simply 
cannot take certain acts with legislation.55 The reach and nature of 
this substantive review has changed drastically over the years.56 
48 See infra text accompanying notes 81-215. 
49 "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities 
of citizens ofthe United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
50 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872); Charles A. Miller, The Forest of Due 
Process Law: The American Constitutional Tradition, in DUE PROCESS 17 (J. Roland Pennock 
and John W. Chapman, eds., 1977). 
51 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1985); Honda v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2342 (1994). 
52 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 355 (4th ed. 1991). 
Judicial review of procedural due process challenges examines the nature of the interest and 
the amount of procedural protection which is due, and employs a balancing test to determine 
what procedures are appropriate. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1975). Procedural 
due process applies to systems of individualized deprivations, not directly legislated ones. See 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 682-83 (2d ed. 1988). 
53 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 52, at 351. Many commentators agree that this substantive 
component of due process review was not intended by the authors of the 14th Amendment. See, 
e.g., Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 
85 (1963) (noting that substantive due process review may be "wholly a judicial creation"). 
54 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Were due process 
merely a procedural safeguard it would fail to reach those situations where the deprivation of 
life, liberty or property was accomplished by legislation which by operating in the future could, 
given even the fairest possible procedure in application to individuals, nevertheless destroy the 
enjoyment of all three."). Justice Harlan's view of substantive due process as protecting rights 
from legislative interference was borne out four years later, in Griswold v. Connecticut. See 381 
U.S. 479, 484-85 (1964). Justice Harlan, however, took issue with the Court's narrow "penumbra" 
basis for finding protected rights. Id. at 500-02 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
55 Id. at 484-85. 
56 Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down labor regulation in 
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Initially, the Court used substantive due process review to strike 
down legislation that the Justices felt to be unwise or ill-considered.57 
The zenith of this highly activist approach was the 1905 landmark 
decision Lochner v. New York, in which the Supreme Court used 
substantive due process review to strike down a New York statute 
regulating the hours of workers in bakeries.58 The Court argued that 
the law arbitrarily and unnecessarily violated a person's freedom to 
contract his or her own hours, and that the police powers of the state 
could not override liberties and rights of individuals.59 
Within thirty years, however, judicial intervention in such economic 
regulation on due process grounds had been almost completely dis-
credited.60 In United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Court up-
held a milk regulation, applying a presumption of constitutionality to 
economic regulations in substantive due process attacks.61 During the 
ensuing decades, the Court's presumption of constitutionality has 
included a willingness to imply hypothetical justifications for regula-
tions in order to find them constitutional, even where there was no 
indication that these reasons in fact motivated the legislators.62 In 
1963, the Court explicitly stated that it had abandoned the use ofthe 
Due Process Clause to nUllify unwise economic legislation.63 
bakeries as interfering with rights of contract) with Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731--32 
(1963) (upholding statute prohibiting non-lawyers from engaging in business of debt adjusting) 
and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (invalidating Texas statute's near-total prohibition of 
abortion as interfering with due process right of privacy). 
57 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 593 (1897). 
58 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64. 
59 [d. at 60, 62. 
60 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 
291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). In West Coast Hotel, the Court upheld a state minimum wage law for 
women, directly overruling Lochner-era precedent. 300 U.S. at 400 (overruling Adkins v. Chil-
dren's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923». However, some commentators have argued that the Court's 
shift is not necessarily a total repudiation of the Lochner approach. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 880 (1987). In West Coast Hotel-often seen as the 
keynote example of the modern "hands off" approach-the Court seemed more concerned with 
the need for the minimum wage legislation at issue in the case than with the importance of 
judicial restraint. [d. Professor Sunstein even argues that Lochner has never really been 
overruled. [d. at 875. 
61 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148 (1938). 
62 See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). 
63 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730--S1 (1963). Despite the Court's strong language in 
Ferguson, some commentators have argued that the substantive due process review discredited 
by Lochner continues, albeit without the sensitive due process vocabulary. See Zygmunt J.B. 
Plater and William Lund N orine, Through the Looking Glass of Eminent Domain: Exploring 
the 'Arbitrary And Capricious' Test and Substantive Rationality Review of Governmental 
Decisions, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AF'F. L. REV. 661, 729--30 (1989) ("It is hardly new to assert that 
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Today, the Court has stated that, as long as the government's 
purpose is not illegitimate, and the means chosen to effectuate that 
purpose are not irrational, courts will not interfere with economic 
legislation on substantive due process grounds.64 This highly deferen-
tial standard of review typically is referred to as the "arbitrary and 
capricious" or "rational basis" standard.65 In the .realm of property 
regulation, the government has broad police power authority to re-
strict use of property as long as that restriction rationally furthers 
the public interest.66 Although the "arbitrary and capricious" standard 
is not one of complete deference, post-Lochner courts only rarely have 
struck down property regulations on due process grounds.67 The 
court's deference may be even greater where the deprivation or re-
striction is directly created by statute, rather than through the exer-
cise of administrative discretion.68 
Despite its unwillingness to strike down economic regulations on 
substantive due process grounds, the Supreme Court continues to 
utilize substantive due process review to strike down legislation 
which impinges on so-called "fundamental rights."69 The category of 
fundamental rights includes many of those protected by the Bill 
of Rights70 as well as other rights not mentioned in the Constitu-
generic' substantive due process never disappeared from the courts. Because of the profession's 
aversions to the excesses of the old 'economic' substantive due process cases, however, it is rarer 
to find judges overtly identifying their inquiries as substantive due process."); Miller, supra note 
50, at 31 (substantive review shifted to less "unpalatable phraseology"-i.e., other constitutional 
language-after Lochner). 
64 See Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730-31. 
65 Plater and N orine, supra note 63, at 702. According to Plater and N orine, arbitrary and 
capricious review consists of four categories: the authority of the government to undertake the 
act; whether or not the purpose of the act is a proper, public one; whether there is a reasonable 
relationship of ends to means; and whether or not the burden on any individual is undue. [d. at 
665. 
66 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926). 
67 See Plater and Norine, supra note 63, at 699-701. For an example of a property regulation 
struck down for failing the strict scrutiny reserved for "fundamental interests," see Moore v. 
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505"'{)6 (1977) (striking down housing ordinance restricting 
freedom of extended family members to reside together as interfering with fundamental liberty 
interests). 
68 See Plater and Norine, supra note 63, at 667 n.15. 
69 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 
70 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (holding that certain fundamental 
interests protected by Bill of Rights apply to states under the 14th Amendment); Adamson v. 
California,332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that framers of 14th Amend-
ment intended to apply Amendment to all of Bill of Rights). For a complete discussion of 
whether and to what extent the 14th Amendment includes all the rights guaranteed under the 
Bill of Rights, see Henkin, supra note 53 passim. 
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tion.71 The Court has struggled with how to determine whether or 
not a right should be considered "fundamental," and the categoriza-
tion of rights as fundamental or not has been at times contentious.72 
Rights deemed fundamental primarily have included aspects of pri-
vacy and family affairs, such as marriage, child-rearing and child-
bearing.73 
More recently, the Court has exhibited an increased wariness of 
expanding the category of rights deemed fundamental. 74 In Bowers v. 
Hardwick, for example, a decision upholding a Georgia statute out-
lawing sodomy, the Court warned against the expansion of due proc-
ess protections into previously unprotected areas of rights: 
The Court is most vulnerable and it comes nearest to illegitimacy 
when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or 
no cognizable roots in the language or design in the constitution 
.... There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the 
substantive reach of the [Due Process Clause], particularly if it 
requires redefining the category of rights deemed fundamentaP5 
71 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that Due Process Clause protects 
accused from conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary 
to sustain conviction). 
72 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86, 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring), 499-501 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). The differing conceptions of what constitutes a fundamental right resulted in 
several separate opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut, the case which first applied substantive 
due process protection to fundamental rights. ld. Justice Douglas's majority opinion based 
judicial intervention on a "penumbra theory" of rights. ld. at 481Hl6. Certain rights not spe-
cifically mentioned in the Constitution "emanate" from the guarantees in the Bill of Rights, he 
said, and "help give them life and substance." ld. Justice Goldberg stated that the Ninth 
Amendment demonstrated that the framers of the Constitution believed that certain fundamen-
tal rights existed in addition to the rights protected in the Bill of Rights. ld. at 499 (Goldberg, 
J., concurring). In order to determine what rights are fundamental, Goldberg stated, judges 
should "look to the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our people' to determine whether a 
principle is 'so rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental.'" ld. at 493 (citing Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1933». Justice Harlan, on the other hand, stated that the Due 
Process Clause protects basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Griswold, 381 
U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). The inquiry should not depend on the Bill of Rights or its 
emanations, he said, because the Due Process Clause "stands ... on its own bottom." ld. Justice 
Harlan's view seems to have been borne out in later cases, which held that certain interests 
represent basic human rights which are of fundamental importance to society, without being 
tied to particular constitutional guarantees. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). 
73 See John H. Ely, Forward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5,11 
(1978). Non-privacy oriented rights deemed fundamental for purposes of due process protection 
include the right of interstate travel, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966), and the 
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 
261, 278 (1990). 
74 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986). 
751d. at 194-95. 
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Other attempts to persuade the Court that certain rights should be 
deemed fundamental for the purposes of due process review have 
failed.76 
Where the right infringed upon by government regulation in fact 
is considered fundamental, the Court not only requires that the gov-
ernment purpose behind the law be "compelling," but that the means 
chosen be "narrowly drawn" or even "necessary" to achieve that end.77 
This standard of review is frequently described as "strict scrutiny."78 
In summary, substantive due process review today typically is 
viewed in the context of a dichotomy between economic regulation on 
the one hand, and regulations impacting "fundamental interests" on 
the other.79 The decision as to which standard of review to apply to a 
regulation usually determines the outcome, because the standard is 
one of extreme deference for economic regulation, and one of strictest 
scrutiny where fundamental interests are at stake.so 
v. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION 
WHICH ALTERS TRADITIONAL COMMON LAW REMEDIES 
The standard of review used by the Court where a statute has 
eliminated a mechanism of the common law does not fit comfortably 
into the two-tiered analysis described above.81 Although common law 
abrogation appears to be a species of "economic" regulation,82 the 
Court does not utilize the bare-bones rationality review that, accord-
ing to cases like Ferguson v. Skrupa and United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., statutes of this classification are due.83 Instead, the 
76 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 596-98 (1977) (upholding state statute requiring 
collection of information about prescription drug users); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 
(1976) (upholding statute requiring short haircuts for police officers). 
77 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
78 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 52, at 575. Strict scrutiny review has been used more 
frequently in equal protection challenges. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) 
(striking down statute prohibiting miscegenation as being unnecessary to accomplishment of 
permissible state objective). 
79 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 52, at 374, 388. 
80 See Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980). 
81 Compare Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 82-94 (1978) 
with Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-32 (1963); see also Jeffrey 
P. DeGraffenreid, Comment, Testing The Constitutionality Of Tort Reform With A Quid Pro 
Quo Analysis: Is Kansas' Judicial Approach An Adequate Substitute For A More Traditional 
Constitutional Requirement?, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 314, 320 (1992) (noting that the Duke Court 
could "certainly" have sustained Price-Anderson Act by using only rational relationship test). 
82 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 82-83. 
83 See Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730-31; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 
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Court employs a multi-factor balancing test to ensure that the chal-
lenged common law change is reasonable and fair.84 Although the 
Court has never held explicitly that the Due Process Clause requires 
a different standard of review where a common law mechanism is 
restricted, the Court almost always has applied greater scrutiny in 
these circumstances.85 As a result, the nature and boundaries of this 
heightened review, and the reasons why such a different standard is 
appropriate, remain unclear.86 
There are two different models for conceptualizing this heightened 
review. One possibility is that traditional common law protections 
inhabit a "gray area" between fundamental rights, such as privacy, 
and interests subject to economic regulation, such as wages or prices, 
and consequently is examined with an "intermediate" level of scru-
tiny.87 Although the Court has never explicitly articulated this possi-
bility, it has utilized "intermediate" levels of scrutiny in other consti-
(1938). Under that standard, a reviewing court would merely inquire if the purpose is legitimate, 
and if the means chosen are rationally related to those ends, i.e., if legislators conceivably could 
have concluded that the means chosen would effectuate the desired ends. Id. 
84 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 82-94; see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 41 (1932) (suggesting 
that standard is one of reasonableness where common law remedies are altered, not simple 
rationality). 
85 Compare Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730-31 with Duke, 438 U.S. at 82-94 and New York Cent. 
R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 196-206 (1917). But see Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929). In 
Silver, the Court applied rational basis scrutiny to a Connecticut statute which provided that 
no person carried gratuitously as a guest in an automobile could recover from the owner or 
operator for injuries caused by its negligent operation. See id. at 122-23. The Court stated, "the 
Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized 
by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative object." Id. at 122. However, just two 
years after Silver, the Court upheld a federal workers' compensation statute only after ensuring 
that the statute provided a replacement to abrogated rights to sue in tort and was consequently 
not unreasonable. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 41. One reason for the difference might be that the 
Court decided Silver on equal protection grounds, and never actually discussed the Due Process 
Clause. See Silver, 280 U.S. at 121-23. 
88 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 82-94. Note that the retroactive elimination of a vested claim or cause 
of action is quite a different issue. See, e.g., Sept. 22 Order, supra note 15, at 4; Elizabeth L. 
Loeb, Note, Constitutional Fallout From The Warner Amendment: Annihilating The Rights 
Of Atomic Weapons Testing Victims, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1355 (1987). The concern here is 
prospective abrogation of rights, remedies or claims. 
87 See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977). The Court has never explicitly 
utilized an intermediate standard for substantive due process challenges, and explicitly refused 
to apply one to the Price-Anderson Act in Duke. See Duke, 438 U.S. at 83-84. However, in a 
due process challenge to a zoning regulation prohibiting certain extended family members from 
residing in the same household, Justice Powell, writing for a plurality, used language which 
suggested intermediate due process scrutiny. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 499. Without explicitly 
applying strict scrutiny review, Powell stated that courts must "examine closely" statutes 
infringing upon important rights of family autonomy. Id. The Court struck down the statute. 
Id. at 499-500. 
1997] ALASKA'S NUISANCE STATUTE 361 
tutional contexts.88 The second possibility is that the Court is in fact 
using an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, but with a 
different definition of arbitrary than that applied in challenges to, say, 
business regulations.89 Under this model, the "rationality" of legisla-
tion is not a static, universal standard, but depends upon the context 
in which rationality is examined.90 By requiring that an alteration to 
the common law abrogation be reasonable and fair, the Court may be 
articulating what it means by "rational" in this context.91 
The precise due process limitations to common law change are not 
clear.92 Legislatures unquestionably have the power to alter the com-
mon law by statute.93 Alteration to the common law frequently is 
necessary as circumstances change; barring revision to traditional 
legal concepts would cause the law to stagnate in outdated and inap-
plicable norms.94 However, the Court has stated that statutory altera-
tion of the common law is not without constitutional limits, and that 
there is a fundamental, normative element to the common law which 
demands constitutional protection from legislative interference.95 In 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, for example, the Court upheld 
a statute which limited private trespass claims against peaceful 
leafletters.96 Justice Marshall joined the opinion of the Court, but 
wrote separately to warn that the common law could not be always 
so readily altered: 
88 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-204 (1976) (applying "intermediate" scrutiny in 
equal protection challenge to statute which discriminates between genders in sale of beer). The 
Court in Duke explicitly rejected petitioner's argument that it should utilize intermediate 
scrutiny to review the Price-Anderson Act. Duke, 438 U.S. at 83-84. However, the possibility 
of intermediate scrutiny in due process challenges has never been foreclosed explicitly. ld. 
89 Compare Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730-31 with Duke, 438 U.S. at 82-94 and New York Cent. 
R.R., 243 U.S. at 196-206. 
90 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 82-94; New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 196-206. 
91 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 82-94; New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 196-206. 
92 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 82-94; New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 196-206. 
93 See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 121 (1929); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876) ("A 
person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law. That is only one of 
the forms of municipal law, and is no more sacred than any other. Rights of property which have 
been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself 
... may be changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the legislature unless prevented by 
constitutional limitations.") (emphasis added). 
94 See Silver, 280 U.S. at 122. 
95 See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93-94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); 
Munn, 94 U.S. at 134. 
96 Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 88. The Court noted that the statute infringed on neither any 
recognized property right nor any First Amendment rights of the mall owners. ld. 
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On the other hand, I do not understand the Court to suggest that 
rights of property are to be defined solely by state law, or that 
there is no federal constitutional barrier to the abrogation of 
common-law rights by Congress or a state government. The con-
stitutional terms ''life, liberty, and property" do not derive their 
meaning solely from the provisions of positive [e.g., statutory] 
law. They have a normative dimension as well, establishing a 
sphere of private autonomy which government is bound to re-
spect. Quite serious constitutional questions might be raised if a 
legislature attempted to abolish certain categories of common-law 
rights in some general way. Indeed, our cases demonstrate that 
there are limits on governmental authority to abolish "core" com-
mon-law rights, including rights against trespass, at least without 
a compelling showing of necessity or a provision for a reasonable 
alternative remedy.97 
According to Marshall, then, the Due Process Clause places constitu-
tional limitations on statutory common law abrogation.98 The Court 
has never explicitly articulated these limits, but these limits have 
become at least partially evident through the inquiry the Court has 
applied in due process challenges to legislative attempts to restrict or 
alter the common law.99 
The due process limits to statutory common law abrogation were 
evident in Duke Power v. Carolina Environmental Study GrOUp.1OO 
The plaintiffs in Duke-an environmental group, a labor union, and a 
number of local property owners-challenged the constitutionality of 
the Price-Anderson ActIOl on equal protection and due process 
grounds.102 With this Act, Congress sought to encourage private nu-
clear energy development by setting a statutory limit of $560 million 
on a nuclear plant's liability for injuries resulting from a catastrophic 
accident.103 Congress considered the cap, in effect a limitation on the 
common law right to sue under negligence or strict liability, to be vital 
to the development of the private nuclear power industry, which could 
not secure insurance for potentially massive damage claims.104 The 
97 Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 93-94 (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
98 [d. 
99 See supra text accompanying notes 124-215. 
100 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 82-94 (1978). 
101 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970 & Supp. V). 
102 Duke, 438 U.S. at 67-68. 
103 [d. at 63-64. As a federal statute, the Price-Anderson Act was challenged under the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. [d. at 67. There is, however, no meaningful difference 
between the due process protections of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. See Twining 
v. State of New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908); Carrol v. Greenwich Ins. Co. of New York, 199 
U.S. 401, 410 (1905). 
104 Duke, 438 U.S. at 63-64. The nuclear power industry had petitioned Congress for relief 
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Act required Congress, should an accident result in damages in excess 
of $560 million, to take whatever action was required to protect the 
public from the consequences of such a disaster.105 After Congress 
passed the Act, Duke Power Company, a privately-owned utility, 
began constructing nuclear power plants in North and South Caro-
lina.106 
The plaintiffs successfully persuaded the United States District 
Court for the Western District of North Carolina that the Price-An-
derson Act violated the Due Process Clause because injuries could 
occur without any assurance that victims would be compensated ade-
quately.107 The District Court's decision noted that the statutory limit 
was not rationally related to potential losses, that it tended to encour-
age irresponsibility in matters of safety, and that there was no "quid 
pro quo" for the liability limitation.108 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, and reversed. 109 The 
Court stated that the Price-Anderson Act was "classic" economic 
regulation, and hence the appropriate standard of review was the 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. l1° Thus, the Act came before the 
Court with a presumption of constitutionality and "the burden [was] 
on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the 
legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way."111 
Although purporting to apply an "arbitrary and capricious" stand-
ard, the Court nevertheless conducted an examination of the statute 
that was not nearly so circumscribed.112 The Court inquired into a 
number of different factors and circumstances to ensure that the 
Price-Anderson Act was reasonable and fair to affected individuals.ll3 
The Duke Court's inquiry has been utilized in other due process 
because, despite the remote likelihood of a major accident, potential liabilities still dwarfed the 
ability of the industry and private insurance companies to absorb the risk. Id. 
105Id. at 66-67; see 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e). 
106 Duke, 438 U.S. at 67. 
107 Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203, 
222-25 (W.D.N.C. 1977). 
108 [d. at 222-24. The decision also found that the statute, by forcing victims of nuclear 
accidents to bear all of the injury, violated the Equal Protection Clause. [d. at 224-25. 
109 Duke, 438 U.S. at 67. 
11°Id. at 83. The Court found that the statute was 'classic' economic regulation because the 
record showed that Congress sought to encourage private nuclear power while providing for 
public compensation in the event of a nuclear accident. Id. It was therefore a legislative effort 
to adjust "the burdens and benefits of economic life," the very definition of economic regulation. 
Id. (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)). 
111 Duke, 438 U.S. at 83-84 (citing Usery, 428 U.S. at 15). 
112 See id.; DeGraffenreid, supra note 81, at 320. 
113 Duke, 438 U.S. at 82-94. 
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challenges, which, taken together, provide a working model for the 
Court's standard of review for common law abrogation cases.114 
In its examination of the Price-Anderson Act, the Duke Court first 
demonstrated that the Act was necessary; without the Price-Ander-
son Act, private nuclear energy, an industry perceived as critically 
important for the nation, certainly would fail. 115 Second, the Court 
explained that potentially affected residents received an adequate 
substitute remedy for their lost common law protections.116 Third, the 
Court explained why the statutory compensation scheme offered vari-
ous additional benefits which were unavailable under the common law, 
as it allowed for more certain compensation for harms and speedier 
settlement of claims.117 Fourth, the Court noted that the chance of an 
accident that would exceed the $560 million liability limit was exceed-
ingly remote.118 Moreover, the Court found that the Act would not 
increase the risk of an accident because it did not remove safety 
incentives for plant managers or alter the integrity of the permitting 
process.119 
Duke's analysis, when considered along with other Supreme Court 
cases, indicates that substantive due process review where a legisla-
ture alters traditional common law protections is not the black and 
white test of "rationality" utilized in cases like Ferguson v. Skrupa. l20 
Rather, review of common law abrogation includes a nuanced balanc-
ing of various factors to ensure that the challenged statute is reason-
able and fair. 121 This balancing seems designed to draw out the "nor-
mative boundaries" of the common law noted by Marshall in 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, beyond which governments 
cannot gO.122 The following discussion examines in greater detail some 
of these balancing factors, not only those in Duke but also those in 
other cases in which statutes have abrogated common law compensa-
tory mechanisms.l23 
114 See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 196-206 (1917). This "model" of 
reasonableness balancing is set forth below. See supra text accompanying notes 124-215. 
115 Duke, 438 U.S. at 84. 
116 [d. at 87-94. The government had promised as part of the same legislation to take whatever 
steps would be necessary to make up for any shortfall between the liability limit and the actual 
damages suffered. See id. 
117 [d. at 89-94. 
118 [d. at 86 n.28. 
119 [d. at 87. 
120 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 84-94; Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963). 
121 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 84-94. 
122 See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93-94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
123 Although the factors are discussed individually, they are elements of a balancing test 
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A. Statutory Replacements to the Abrogated Common 
Law Remedies 
365 
In many common law abrogation cases, the Court inquires whether 
or not the statute that abrogates the common law provides some form 
of alternative to take its place.124 The Court's due process concern 
appears muted where a legislature simply replaces a common law 
mechanism for compensating harms with a statutory one.125 Whether 
some reasonable replacement to altered traditional mechanisms is 
actually mandated by the Due Process Clause, however, is unclear.126 
The Supreme Court has confronted this question on a few occasions, 
but never has decided it explicitly.127 The language and reasoning used 
in many cases, however, suggests that the Court would in fact require 
such a substitute were it ever forced to directly confront the question.l28 
In Duke, the Court relied heavily on the fact that the Price-Ander-
son Act provided a "reasonably just alternative" to the common law 
tort claims that the Act barred in finding that the Act did not repre-
sent a deprivation of property without due process.129 The Duke Court 
avoided holding that the Due Process Clause positively demands 
some sort of substitute for the common law protections it abrogates.13o 
Instead, the Court found that the challenged statutory scheme did in 
fact provide a reasonable substitute for the abrogated compensatory 
mechanisms, and thus saw no need to resolve this long-standing ques-
tion directly.131 However, the Duke Court offered a strong hint that, 
wherein a shortcoming in one area might be made more constitutionally "palatable" by a strong 
showing in another. The exact weight to be accorded any single factor, however, is unclear. 
124 See, e.g., Duke, 438 U.S. at 87-92; New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201-D2 
(1917). 
125 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 87-92; New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 201-02. 
126 Duke, 438 U.S. at 88. 
127 See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 474 U.S. 892, 892-95 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). 
The Fein case provided such an opportunity, but the Court dismissed the case for want of a 
substantial federal question. I d. The refusal to deal with the question of whether or not the Due 
Process Clause demands a "quid pro quo" in exchange for lost common law rights prompted a 
dissent from Justice White. [d. White noted that the circuits and states were split on whether 
or not the Due Process Clause required a reasonable alternative, and that the Supreme Court 
should settle the issue. [d. 
128 See infra text accompanying note 133. 
129 Duke, 438 U.S. at 87-92. Congress, as part of the challenged legislation, had committed 
itself to compensating any injuries or property damage that were not covered by the $560 million 
in liability insurance to be carried by the nuclear plants. [d. at 93. In other words, no one would 
suffer uncompensated damage under the Act; Congress would have to pay whatever the plant 
owners could not. [d. 
130 [d. at 88. 
131 [d. 
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were it ever forced to confront the issue head-on, some substitute-or 
perhaps at least a strong justification on why one is impracticable-
would be required.132 The Court stated, "[Congress's] panoply of 
remedies and guarantees is at the least a reasonably just substitute 
for the common-law rights replaced by the Price-Anderson Act. Noth-
ing more is required by the Due Process Clause."133 
The issue of whether or not the Due Process Clause requires that 
abrogated or altered common law mechanisms be replaced with some 
alternative also has been dealt with in due process challenges to 
worker compensation statutes.134 In one of the earliest of these cases, 
New York Central Railroad v. White, the Supreme Court rejected a 
due process challenge to New York's Workmen's Compensation 
Law.135 The statute eliminated traditional negligence suits for death 
or injury in certain industries deemed particularly hazardous and set 
out a prescribed schedule for compensation regardless of fault. 136 Af-
ter one railroad employee accidentally was killed, both the railroad 
and the worker's widow challenged the suit on constitutional 
grounds.137 The employee's widow claimed that the statute repre-
sented a violation of the Due Process Clause by limiting her to a 
prescribed amount of compensation, regardless of the circumstances, 
and deprived her of the opportunity to argue for a fuller recovery.13S 
In at least partial agreement with the plaintiff, the Court expressed 
doubt that a legislature simply can obliterate traditional protections 
such as negligence suits without leaving anything in their stead.139 The 
Court cautioned that the case should not be read to mean "that any 
scale of compensation, however insignificant on the one hand or oner-
ous on the other, would be supportable."140 As did the Court in Duke, 
132 [d. at 93. 
133 [d. (emphasis added). The district court, in fact, had held that the Due Process Clause 
requires some reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation. Carolina 
Envtl. Study Group v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203, 223 (W.D.N.C. 
1977). The United States Supreme Court did not disagree with this statement; it merely viewed 
the Price-Anderson Act as providing the necessary quantum of protection. Duke, 438 U.S. at 
87-93. 
134 See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,201-02 (1917). 
135 [d. 
136 [d. at 192. 
137 [d. at 190. 
138 [d. at 196-97. The Railroad also mounted a due process claim because it was being held 
liable regardless of fault. [d. at 196-97. That argument was rejected. [d. at 209. 
139 New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 201 ("[I]t perhaps may be doubted whether the State 
could abolish all rights of action on the one hand, or all defenses on the other, without setting 
up something adequate in their stead."). 
140 [d. at 205. 
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however, the Court in New York Central Railroad declined to answer 
the question directly because the workmen's compensation statute, 
by providing a universally applicable schedule of reasonable compen-
sation, did provide a just and fair substitute to the common law.l4l 
Although an injured party lost the opportunity to make an argument 
for higher compensation based on special circumstances or particu-
larly egregious negligence on the employer's behalf, the statute guar-
anteed to the parties a fair and reasonable compensation.l42 By simply 
replacing a traditional compensation scheme with a similar statutory 
one, the workmen's compensation law did not represent a violation of 
due process.143 
Although the Court has refused to decide explicitly whether or not 
the Due Process Clause requires that common law protections be 
replaced with a reasonable substitute if abrogated, the Court never 
has been confronted with a statute that does not somehow replace the 
altered common law mechanism.l44 In light of the importance the 
Court has attached to this issue and the language utilized in Duke, 
however, the Court eventually may find that the Due Process Clause 
demands such a reasonable alternative, or at least some compelling 
reason why one is not possible.145 
B. Other Benefits or Advantages Conferred by the Statute 
Another factor considered by the Court in due process challenges 
to common law abrogation statutes is whether the statutory altera-
tion of common law provides new, alternative benefits to the party 
whose common law rights and remedies have been restricted by a 
statute.146 Even if a statute does not fully replace the compensatory 
141 Id. at 201. 
142 Id. at 201--02. 
14:3 Id. Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court relied on New York Central Railroad to sustain 
the Longshoreman and Harbor Workers Act, a federal workers' compensation plan. Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 41 (1932). The statute was found constitutional only after the Court 
concluded that "the classifications of the statute [and] the extent of the compensation provided 
are [not] unreasonable." Id. 
144 See supra note 127. 
145 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 93 (1978). 
146 See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 201. Although the "other benefits" inquiry is 
closely related to that of "reasonable alternatives," it can be considered distinct. In the "alter-
natives" category, the Court inquires simply if there is some alternative remedial mechanism 
offered by the challenged statute in exchange for the common law rights the statute restricts 
or abrogates. See id. at 200--03. The "benefits" inquiry carries that examination further, to 
determine if the statute provides additional advantages or benefits that the affected parties did 
not have under the common law. See Duke, 438 U.S. at 87-93. While these advantages are 
typically linked to the nature of the remedy, the Court has never stated that non-remedial 
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mechanisms of the common law, the Court apparently will balance 
that loss with other advantages which accrue to the affected parties.147 
In Duke, for example, the Supreme Court found that the statutory 
liability scheme not only reasonably replaced the common law, but, by 
offering to the affected parties a variety of advantages unavailable 
under common law tort remedies, was in fact superior.l48 The Court 
noted that it was not at all clear that a plant could even pay an amount 
as large as $560 million in common law tort claims in the event of a 
catastrophic accident in the first place.149 The Price-Anderson Act 
assured that plants would be able to provide at least that amount of 
compensation.l50 Moreover, the statute ensured more equitable com-
pensation than could the common law.151 Under traditional liability 
rules, the first few parties in massive claims often exhaust all of a 
defendant's resources, leaving slower-moving parties with no compen-
sation whatsoever.152 The Act, in contrast, ensured that everyone 
would be compensated, regardless of speed or litigation strategy.l53 
The Act further obviated the need to prove fault or other wrongdoing 
in order to receive compensation, as would be necessary under a 
common law cause of action.154 Under the Act, compensation for loss 
would follow regardless of the cause of the accident, including "acts 
of God" which provide an affirmative defense to tort claims.155 Conse-
benefits cannot be considered. See id. Many commentators and cases lump the two categories 
together as a general category of "quid pro quo" for lost rights. See id.; DeGraffenreid, supra 
note 81, at 317-29. The separation into distinct sub-categories for the purposes of this argument 
reflects the fact than some decisions appear to treat the two separately, as well as the fact that 
some cases have looked to benefits unrelated to the remedy (for example, the general benefit 
of lower medical costs in malpractice award restrictions) in balancing due process concerns. See 
infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. 
147 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 87-93; New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 201-06. 
148 Duke, 438 U.S. at 89-92. 
149 [d. at 92 n.36. Expert testimony offered to the District Court indicated that the Duke 
Power Company could not be expected to accumulate more than $200 million in damage claims 
without reaching the point of insolvency. [d. Even with the full amount of private insurance 
available, the company could not pay the $560 million provided for under the Price-Anderson 
Act. [d. 
150 [d. 
151 [d. at 89-92. 
152 [d. at 90. The Court cited the testimony of the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission: "The prospect of inequitable distribution would produce a race to the courthouse 
door in contrast to the present system of assured orderly and equitable compensation." [d. 
(citing Hearings on H.R. 8631 Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 69 (1975». 
153 Duke, 438 U.S. at 91-92. 
154 [d. at 91. 
155 [d. at 91-92. The Court noted that the "act of God" scenario-an earthquake or major 
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quently, the Act's compensation system ensured speedy, certain, and 
efficient settlement of claims, something for which the common law, 
the Court noted, is not well known.156 
The same reasoning was utilized by the Court in New York Central 
Railroad to analyze New York's Workmen's Compensation Act.157 
Although workers gave up the possibility of large settlements in a 
common law suit, they received in exchange the certainty that some 
reasonable compensation would be paid, and paid quickly.15s The 
worker was spared the difficulties of proving negligence or the 
amount of damages, as would be necessary under the common law.159 
As a result of these benefits to the parties who had lost their tradi-
tional right to sue their employer, the Court held, "the particular rules 
of the common law affecting the subject-matter are not placed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment beyond the reach of the law making power 
of the State."160 
The Supreme Court never has considered benefits beyond those 
directly associated with the nature of the remedy provided for under 
the statute as cognizable in due process balancing.161 State courts 
attempting to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of the issue 
of other benefits, however, have been hesitant to expand the category 
of cognizable benefits to balance against the loss of common law 
rights.162 For example, several state supreme courts have stated that 
the ''benefit'' of lower medical costs and insurance premiums could not 
justify restricting the amount of compensation available in malprac-
tice suits.163 
storm-would be more likely as the cause of a massive accident at a nuclear plant than under 
general circumstances. [d. 
156 [d. at 92. 
157 New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,201--04 (1917). 
158 [d. at 201. 
159 [d. at 202--04. 
160 [d. at 202. 
161 See, e.g., Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 87-93 (1978); New Yark 
Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 199-207. 
162 See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 836 (N.H. 1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 
125, 13~6 (N.D. 1978); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ill. 1976). 
163 Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 136; Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 742; see also Smith v. Department of 
Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1089 (Fla. 1987) (holding that affordable health insurance was too specu-
lative a benefit to balance against cap on non-economic damages in state tort claims); Carson, 
424 A.2d at 837 ("It is simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of supporting the 
medical care industry solely upon those persons who are most severely injured and therefore 
most in need of compensation."). 
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As with the question of "reasonable alternatives," the Court never 
has stated explicitly that such alternative benefits or advantages are 
required by the Due Process Clause when common law rights are 
restricted.l64 However, the language of these cases suggests that such 
alternative benefits remain an important balancing factor in due proc-
ess scrutiny.l65 
C. The Need for the Common Law Change 
Another factor that the Supreme Court has considered in due proc-
ess inquiries into common law alteration is the need for the challenged 
statute.166 Nominally, the Court treats the inquiry into the need of a 
statute very differently depending on whether it is applying the 
rational basis test for economic legislation or the strict scrutiny test 
reserved for fundamental rights.167 However, the Court's inquiry into 
the need for statutes which abrogate the common law does not fit 
comfortably into this dichotomy, and demonstrates further that due 
process scrutiny implicitly is higher for statutes which alter the com-
mon law.l68 
A demonstration of the "need" for a statute is an important element 
of the strict scrutiny due process review used where statutes impinge 
upon fundamental rights.169 According to Justice Harlan, the scope of 
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause "includes a freedom 
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and needless restraints," 
and recognizes that "certain interests require particularly careful 
scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment."17o As 
a result, the Court requires that statutes which restrict a fundamental 
interest be drawn as narrowly as possible.l7l According to the Court 
in Roe v. Wade, statutes which unnecessarily or over-expansively 
restrict fundamental interests violate the Due Process Clause.172 
164 See, e.g., Duke, 438 U.S. at 87-93; New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 199--207. 
165 See Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) ("[IJt is safe to reflect, 
we think, that where a true quid pro quo does exist, it strengthens the statute's constitutional-
ity."). 
166 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 84. 
167 Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) with Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1976). 
166 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 84. 
169 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
170 [d. (emphasis added). 
171 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. 
172 [d. 
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In due process challenges to legislation that does not impact funda-
mental interests, on the other hand, the Court has explicitly stated 
that courts have no business asking whether or not the legislation is 
needed.173 Courts are consequently not invited to question the neces-
sity of a challenged statute when using "rational basis" scrutiny.174 As 
the Supreme Court stated in Whalen v. Roe, "state legislation which 
has some effect on individual liberty or privacy may not be held 
unconstitutional simply because a court finds it unnecessary, in whole 
or in part."175 Indeed, such invasive judicial scrutiny of state regula-
tion is the essence of judicial interference with legislation from the 
discredited Lochner era.176 
However, the Supreme Court appears to demand that significant 
alterations to the common law be necessary for some government 
objective in order to comport with the Due Process Clause.177 This is 
true even where the Court insists that it is using the "rational basis" 
scrutiny for economic legislation.178 Justice Marshall explicitly stated 
that necessity was a due process consideration where legislatures 
abrogate common law rights.179 "Indeed," Justice Marshall stated, 
"our cases demonstrate that there are limits on governmental author-
ity to abolish 'core' common-law rights, including rights against tres-
pass, at least without a compelling showing of necessity or a provision 
for a reasonable alternative remedy."180 
In Duke, the Court predicated a conclusion that the Price-Anderson 
Act's liability cap did not violate due process on its finding that the 
Act was necessary for the development of the private nuclear power 
industry.181 Without such a cap, both Congress and the Court found, 
the industry simply could not develop.l82 Because the liability limita-
tion was necessary to that legitimate objective, the Court noted, it 
173 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1976); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954); 
Plater and Norine, supra note 63, at 693-97. 
174 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597; Olsen v. Nebraska ex reI. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 
U.S. 236, 246 (1940) ("We are not concerned, however, with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness 
of the legislation."). 
175 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597. 
176 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
177 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978). 
178 [d. at 83. 
179 Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
180 [d. (emphasis added). 
181 Duke, 438 U.S. at 84. 
182 [d. at 63-65. 
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bore a rational relationship to Congress's goal,183 The language of the 
opinion suggests that the link between the rationality of a statute and 
the need for it is quite direct: "The record before us fully supports the 
need for the imposition of a statutory limit on liability to encourage 
private industry participation and hence bears a rational relationship 
to Congress's concern for [encouraging private nuclear power devel-
opment]."184 
In Duke, the Court seemed to suggest that the challenged common 
law alteration was an effective means of handling a serious policy 
problem.185 The policy in question was complex, and the consequences 
of not altering the common law were potentially grave.186 "Rational" 
in this context thus appears not only to mean that the common law 
change is conceivably related to a legitimate government end, but 
that the legislation is required to address squarely a genuine policy 
issue.187 This reasoning suggests that where the statutory abrogation 
of common law rights is not really needed in order to effectuate a 
policy goal, courts should not consider the statute to be rational.188 
Courts will not necessarily query whether or not a challenged statute 
is the best possible or even the only available means of effectuating 
the intended goal,189 Rather, the Court's inquiry suggests that where 
statutes deprive individuals of traditional protections and remedies, 
the Due Process Clause at the very least demands that the depriva-
tion be warranted by the circumstances.19o 
D. Risk of Harm 
A final factor in the due process balancing of common law abroga-
tion is the likelihood of harm and whether the challenged restriction 
of common law remedies will result in an increased risk of harm to 
those individuals whose common law rights have been restricted.191 In 
some instances where common law rights are restricted by statute, 
the Court has inquired into how likely it is that affected parties would 
183 Id. at 84. 
184 Id. (emphasis added). 
185 See id. at 84. 
186 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 84. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. at 84. 
190 See id. 
191 Duke, 438 U.S. at 86-88. 
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ever have the opportunity to exercise those rights.l92 Moreover, the 
Court has inquired if the restriction of common law rights and reme-
dies would result in an increase in the likelihood of injuries that those 
rights were meant to prevent.l93 In other words, a restriction of a 
common law right seems more violative of the Due Process Clause 
where the absence of a remedy removes incentives for parties to avoid 
harming others. 
In Duke, the Court took pains to note the vanishingly small possi-
bility that the Price-Anderson Act's liability limits would ever be 
invoked at all. l94 The risk of a nuclear accident that would cause more 
than $560 million in damage, the Court found, was almost nonex-
istent.195 In so stating, the Court seemed to suggest that legislatures 
could reasonably restrict rights which almost certainly never would 
be invoked.l96 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court disputed the District Court's 
conclusion that the liability limitation would encourage irresponsibil-
ity and increase the likelihood of an accident.197 Nothing in the liability 
limitation, noted the Supreme Court, undermined the rigor or integ-
rity of the permitting process for nuclear power plants.198 Moreover, 
"the risk of financial loss and possible bankruptcy to the utility is in 
itself no small incentive to avoid the kind of cavalier conduct implicitly 
attributed to licensees by the District Court."199 Thus, according to 
the Supreme Court, the liability limitations of the Price-Anderson Act 
in no way detracted from the protection of the public.2°O 
This inquiry was mirrored in a due process challenge to a govern-
ment immunity statute in Martinez v. Calijornia.201 The challenged 
statute in Martinez granted total immunity to state employees from 
liability resulting from injuries occurring as a result of parole board 
192 See id. 
193 See id. at 86--88; Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281 (1980). 
194 Duke, 438 U.S. at 86--88. The Court cited a 1975 study that found that the chances of an 
accident causing $100 million in damages and minor health effects was one in 20,000. [d. at 86 
n.28. The chances of an accident causing $14 billion in damages, 3300 fatalities, and 45,000 early 
illnesses was estimated to be one in one billion. [d. 
195 [d. at 86. 
196 [d. 
197 [d. at 87. 
198 [d. 
199 Duke, 438 U.S. at 86. 
200 See id. at 87. 
201 444 U.S. 277, 283 (1980). 
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decisions.202 The due process challenge was raised by a family that was 
prevented from suing the parole board after a dangerous felon, whom 
the board had released, raped and murdered their daughter.203 
The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, finding that the immu-
nity statute was too attenuated from the murder to constitute cogni-
zable government action.204 Immunity from tort suits does not violate 
due process, the Court held, simply because it incrementally impacts 
the probability of harm to an innocent bystander.205 This statute did 
not encourage irresponsible action, the Court noted, but rather was 
one consideration in one small piece-the parole board's release of the 
felon-in a complex chain of events.206 In other words, the immunity 
statute did not violate the Due Process Clause because it did not 
contribute to the injury suffered by the family.207 Under this analysis, 
however, if immunity from tort claims did in fact significantly contrib-
ute to an injury, the immunity statute would implicate due process 
concern.208 
In both Duke and Mariinez, the Supreme Court emphasized that 
the abrogation of common law tort remedies did not increase the 
likelihood of harm to others.209 This reasoning suggests that a limita-
tion on common law liability that does increase the likelihood of 
harm-perhaps by reducing the incentive for due care-may run afoul 
of the general due process inquiry into fairness and reasonableness.21o 
E. Summary 
When a court is presented with a due process challenge to a statute 
that alters traditional compensatory mechanisms and legal protec-
tions of the common law, that court should inquire whether the statute 
replaces the traditional protections with new ones or other advan-
tages, if it is needed, and whether it will increase the likelihood of 
injury.211 These distinct but related balancing factors suggest that the 
Due Process Clause demands that common law abrogation be basi-
202 [d. at 279. 
203 [d. at 280. 
204 [d. at 28l. 
205 [d. 
206 Martinez, 444 U.S. at 28l. 
207 See id. 
208 See id. 
209 See id.; Duke, 438 U.S. at 86. 
210 See Martinez, 444 U.S. at 281; Duke, 438 U.S. at 86. 
211 See supra text accompanying notes 124-210. 
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cally reasonable and fair.212 In other words, the United States Su-
preme Court has implicitly stated that statutes that unnecessarily 
render individuals subject to uncompensated injuries are irrational, 
and hence violative of the Due Process Clause.213 This reasonableness-
based conception of "rationality" is a far cry from that applied to 
purely economic due process challenges, wherein a regulation is im-
mune from due process challenge as long as legislators conceivably 
could have concluded that the chosen means would effectuate a legiti-
mate objective.214 Cases like Duke undercut the notion that courts 
always will be extremely deferential when confronted with "eco-
nomic" regulation.215 
VI. UNDERSTANDING THE COURT'S HEIGHTENED DUE PROCESS 
SCRUTINY OF COMMON LAW ABROGATION: SOME 
UNDERLYING THEMES 
How is the United States Supreme Court's reasonableness balanc-
ing consistent with the general post-Lochner view that economic 
regulation is subject to almost total due process deference from the 
courts? What is the reason for the Court's examination of the reason-
ableness and fairness of common law alterations? Because the Court 
212 See id. While the distinct balancing factors provide a logical categorization for analysis, the 
inquiry is ultimately holistic and integrating. The New York Central Railroad Court held: 
Viewing the entire matter, it cannot be pronounced arbitrary and unreasonable for 
the State to impose upon the employer the absolute duty of making a moderate and 
definite compensation in money to every disabled employee, or in case of his death to 
those who were entitled to look to him for support, in lieu of the common-law liability 
confined to cases of negligence. 
New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,205 (1917) (emphasis added). The Duke Court 
echoed this theme when it stated: 
When appraised in terms of both the extremely remote possibility of an accident where 
liability would exceed the limitation and Congress' now statutory commitment to "take 
whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the 
consequences of" any such disaster, we hold the congressional decision to fix a $560 
million ceiling ... to be within permissible limits and not violative of due process. 
Duke, 438 U.S. at 86-87. 
213 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 86-87. 
214 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963). Had the Court applied the 
standard of review used in these cases to the Price-Anderson Act, the Court could have reached 
its result much more quickly. See DeGraffenreid, supra note 81, at 320. The most basic ration-
ality review of the Price-Anderson Act would simply state that encouraging private nuclear 
power development is a proper government objective, and that Congress could have conceivably 
believed that the Act's liability limitations would help effectuate that goal. See Ferguson, 372 
U.S. at 730-31. 
215 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 84-94. 
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has never even acknowledged explicitly that common law alteration 
demands scrutiny for reasonableness, the justification for this scru-
tiny remains hidden. However, common law abrogation implicates 
certain issues which the Court has noted merit particular concern. 
History and tradition, for example, playa central role in the articula-
tion of due process boundaries.216 Statutes which alter ancient com-
mon law mechanisms consequently seem to merit greater due process 
scrutiny than statutes which alter less traditional rights.217 Moreover, 
the Court appears to be responding to issues of "natural law" and 
fundamental fairness, concerns that may be implicated where legisla-
tures eliminate traditional legal protections.218 Finally, the Court also 
has articulated a due process requirement of a "right to redress," and 
thus demands that individuals be left with some sort of reasonable 
compensatory mechanism.219 
This section attempts to trace some of these themes in greater 
detail. Although these factors are not always explicitly discussed in 
common law abrogation cases, the concerns and interests that they 
represent could be influencing the Court to utilize a standard of 
review which does not fit into the traditional dichotomy of substantive 
due process review.220 
A. "Natural Justice" Concerns: Due Process as Ensuring the 
Fundamental Fairness of Statutes221 
One possible explanation for the Court's willingness to examine 
closely common law abrogation and liability limitations is that these 
legislative acts often implicate issues of fundamental fairness and 
natural justice.222 Natural justice stands for the proposition that there 
are fundamental, normative standards of fairness that cannot be ig-
216 See infra Section VLB. 
217 See id. 
218 See infra Section VLA. 
219 See infra Section VLC. 
22() See, e.g., Duke, 438 U.S. at 82-94; New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 196-206 
(1917). 
221 The issues of natural justice, natural law and the role of basic fairness concerns in consti-
tutional due process jurisprudence are complex and numerous. A full discussion of this topic is 
beyond the scope of this paper. The purpose of this section is to touch on the concern of natural 
justice, and how the Court's review seems to reflect an underlying concern that statutes should 
be reasonable and fair in their effect on individuals. For. a more recent revisitation of the issue 
of natural law generally, see Symposium, Perspectives on Natural Law, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 
(1992). 
222 See New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 202 ("Of course, we cannot ignore the question 
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nored, even absent specific constitutional provisions.223 According to 
some Supreme Court justices, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments incorporate some element of "funda-
mental fairness."224 Natural justice seems to be an applicable consid-
eration where traditional protections of the common law have been 
abrogated and individuals are left subject to injuries that cannot be 
compensated.225 
According to the United States Supreme Court in Calder v. Bull, 
some legislative deprivations are so unfair that they violate the social 
compact, the very purpose for which people enter into organized 
society.226 This "compact" exerts normative limitations on legislative 
authority.227 Legislation that oversteps these boundaries is not a right-
ful exercise of state authority, and hence is void.228 This social compact 
limit in large measure drives substantive due process review, the 
judicial articulation of the limits on legislative power.229 
whether the new arrangement is arbitrary and unreasonable, from the standpoint of natural 
justice."). 
223 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 392-94 (1798). 
224 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 355, 372 n.5 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice 
Harlan's frustration with one of his colleague's narrow interpretation of the Due Process Clause 
prompted the following footnote: 
I cannot refrain from expressing my continued bafflement at my Brother Black's 
insistence that due process, whether under the Fourteenth Amendment or the Fifth 
Amendment, does not embody a concept of fundamental fairness as part of our scheme 
of constitutionally ordered liberty. His thesis flies in the face of a course of judicial 
history reflected in an unbroken line of opinions that have interpreted due process to 
impose restraints on the procedures government may adopt in its dealing with its 
citizens ... as well as the uncontroverted scholarly research ... respecting the intend-
ment of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .... 
Id. (citations omitted); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 52, at 388 ("[Flundamental 
rights analysis is simply no more than the modern recognition of the natural law concepts first 
espoused by Justice Chase in Calder v. BulL"). 
225 See New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 203. 
226 Calder, 3 U.S. at 394. . 
227 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 52, at 351. Presumably, the idea of a "social compact" 
underlay Justice Marshall's warning in Pruneyard that there are fundamental elements of the 
common law that simply cannot be abrogated. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 
74, 93-94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
228 Calder, 3 U.S. at 388. 
229 Id.; see also J. Roland Pennock, Introduction, in DUE PROCESS xv, xviii, xxvi (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds., 1977) (due process review incorporates an element of 
"fundamental fairness" as well as justice and rationality). Although in form the Court has 
adopted Justice Iredell's plea for judicial restraint, in substance it continues to utilize "natural 
law" to review acts of the other branches of government. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 
52, at 351. 
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Many commentators-and some members of the Supreme Court-
have viewed the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution230 as the Con-
stitutional "source" of unenumerated natural law rights to be pro-
tected by the courtS.231 As Justice Goldberg pointed out in Griswold 
v. Connecticut, the history of the Ninth Amendment demonstrates 
that the framers intended to ensure that the first eight amendments 
did not exhaust the basic and fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution.232 "[T]he Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Con-
stitution's authors that fundamental rights exist that are not ex-
pressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent that 
the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive."233 The 
right to decide how and when to procreate, Goldberg insisted, must 
be among these basic rights if the Ninth Amendment was to have any 
meaning at all.234 In other words, Goldberg saw the Court's role as 
protecting basic, fundamental values from government interference, 
even if not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.235 
The judicial inquiry into alternatives, necessity, and the risk of 
harm appears to represent an attempt to ensure that the challenged 
common law alteration is not in conflict with concepts of natural 
justice and basic fairness.236 In the examination of New York's work-
ers' compensation law, for example, the Court balanced the various 
factors such as statutory replacement of the common law and other 
quid pro quo benefits specifically within the context of natural jus-
tice.237 The Court found that the challenged workers' compensation 
statute merely redistributed the risks and benefits of employment in 
a way that was basically fair to both employer and employee, and 
reasonable given the balance of risks and costs under the common 
230 "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
231 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 490 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Calvin 
R. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 
305, 313-22 (1987); Ronald E. Klipsch, Aspects of a Constitutional Right to a Habitable Envi-
ronment: Towards an Environmental Due Process, 49 IND. L.J. 203, 219-22 (1974). 
232 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
233 [d. at 492. 
234 [d. at 491. 
235 See id. at 499. Other Justices have noted that certain rights are constitutionally protected 
even absent the Ninth Amendment. See id. at 500-02 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan 
emphasizes respect for the "teachings of history" and the basic values that underlie society. See 
id. at 501-02; infra text accompanying notes 245-64. 
236 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 93 (1978); New 
York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,203 (1917); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 41 (1932). 
237 New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 202. 
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law.238 The Court further noted the fact that employees were not 
forced to participate in the liability limitation scheme, because em-
ployment with a regulated industry was optiona1.239 In light of its basic 
fairness and reasonableness, the Court determined that the statute 
did not violate the Due Process Clause.24o 
In sum, the Due Process Clause appears to implicitly include some 
component of basic fairness.241 Whether articulated in terms of "natu-
rallaw," the social compact which undergirds the Constitution, or the 
Ninth Amendment reservation of "other" rights that cannot be con-
stitutionally infringed, the Court appears concerned with the issue of 
basic fairness when it protects rights with the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.242 Natural law concerns are most obvi-
ously utilized when the Court is protecting the narrow realm of rights 
deemed "fundamental" from legislative interference.243 However, as 
the Court explicitly noted in New York Central Railroad v. White, 
natural justice is also a relevant issue where the challenged statute 
is considered "economic" regulation.244 
B. Substantive Due Process Limits as a Reflection of History 
and Tradition 
The United States Supreme Court has relied heavily on tradition 
and history to articulate the boundaries imposed by the Due Process 
Clause on government action.245 "Due process" means, most funda-
238 [d. at 203--04. With regard to the Railroad's due process challenge, the Court noted: 
It is plain that, on grounds of natural justice, it is not unreasonable for the State, 
while relieving the employer from responsibility for damages measured by common-
law standards and payable in cases where he or those for whose conduct he is answer-
able are found to be at fault, to require him to contribute a reasonable amount, and 
according to a reasonable and definite scale, by way of compensation for the loss of 
earning power incurred in the common enterprise, irrespective of the question of 
negligence, instead of leaving the entire loss to rest where it may chance to fall-that 
is, upon the injured employee or his dependents. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
239 [d. at 203. ("Employer and employee, by mutual consent, engage in a common operation 
intended to be advantageous to both .... "). This inquiry explicitly took place within the context 
of natural law and fairness. [d. at 203-05. 
240 [d. 
241 See supra text accompanying notes 69-78. 
242 See supra text accompanying notes 222-40. 
243 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485--86 (1964). 
244 New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 196-206. 
245 See, e.g., Honda v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 (1994) ("As this Court has stated from its 
first Due Process cases, traditional practice provides a touchstone for constitutional analysis."); 
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (''We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older 
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mentally, the "law of the land," tracing its roots back to the Magna 
Carta and the basic social understandings rooted deep in early Eng-
lish history.246 Due process jurisprudence thus has come to exemplify 
what Justice Harlan referred to as "respect for the teachings of his-
tory, [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our 
society .... "247 According to the Court, long adherence to a particular 
rule does not conclusively establish that rule as a requirement of due 
process.248 However, long adherence to a rule "reflect[s] a profound 
judgment about the way in which the law should be enforced and 
justice administered."249 As a result, many due process challenges look 
to the historical basis of the common law right asserted when deciding 
if a government restriction or alteration of that right has gone too 
far.250 
In Ingraham v. Wright, for example, the Court found a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in freedom from corporal punish-
ment, largely because of the historical and traditional basis for that 
right.251 The Court explained: 
The Due Process Clause ... was intended to give Americans at 
least the protection against governmental power that they had 
enjoyed as Englishmen against the power of the Crown. The 
liberty preserved from deprivation without due process included 
the right "generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at 
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men."252 
than our political parties, older than our school system."); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1926) 
("These cases show that, in determining what due process of law is, under the Fifth or Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding 
existing in the common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors .... "). 
246 See FRANK R. STRONG, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE 
AND NONSENSE 3-18 (1986). The influence of the Magna Carta as the fundamental basis of what 
due process means has long been remarked upoq. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 379 
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting) ("One of the earliest cases in this Court to involve the interpretation 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment declared that 'the words, 'due process of 
law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words 'by the law of the 
land' in Magna Charta."') (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 
272, 276 (1856)); Pennock, supra note 229, at xv ("due process of law" is the official English 
translation of the Magna Carta's "per leggem terrae"). 
247 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
248 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-{i2. 
249Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)). 
250 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-62. 
251 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672-73. 
252Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
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Likewise, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Justice Powell, writ-
ing for the plurality, found that a zoning ordinance violated the Due 
Process Clause in large measure because of the statute's affront to 
traditional concepts of liberty within the family.253 He stated, "[t]he 
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the 
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition."254 Although the history of the substantive reach of the Due 
Process Clause counseled restraint, noted Powell, that history does 
not demand abandonment in the face of government action which 
offends such long-held values.255 
Conversely, due process challenges to government restriction of 
historically unprotected interests are far more likely to fail.Z56 In 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., for example, the Court upheld a statute 
which gave presumptive parental rights to married couples as against 
third-party biological fathers.257 Justice Scalia noted that tradition 
supports relationships that develop within a unitary family, and does 
not give any rights to adulterous fathers.258 The Court's requirement 
that rights protected by the Due Process Clause have deep roots in 
tradition, Scalia noted, was to "prevent future generations from 
lightly casting aside important traditional values .... "259 Similarly, 
the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick held that the Georgia statute out-
lawing sodomy was not unconstitutional, in part because homosexual 
conduct always had been subject to proscription.260 The banning of 
homosexual conduct had "ancient" roots and long-standing acceptance 
in United States history.261 As a result, the Due Process Clause did 
not protect the right to engage in homosexual sodomy.262 
253 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). In Moore, the challenged local 
ordinance proscribed limits on who could live in the same household. The regulation stated that 
certain combinations of extended family members-grandchildren who were cousins, for exam-
ple~ould not live in the same house together. [d. at 496-97. 
254 [d. at 503 (emphasis added). 
255 [d. at 502. Powell was likely referring to the discredited Lochner-era judicial intervention 
in economic and social regulation. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905); supra text 
accompanying notes 57-68. 
256 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S 110, 121-30 (1989). 
257 [d. 
25il [d. at 124-27. 
259 [d. at 122 n.2. 
260 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986). The majority's focus on homosexual 
conduct in this decision, when the statute banned all sodomy, baffled the dissent. See id. at 200 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
261 [d. at 192-94. 
262 [d. at 196. 
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Under the Court's treatment of due process challenges, a key factor 
is the nature of the right asserted, and how long that right has been 
recognized.263 The greater the breach with history, the Court has 
implicitly asserted, the greater the due process protection the Court 
will give.264 
C. Due Process and the Right to a Remedy by Some 
Effective Procedure 
Abrogation and liability limitation statutes conflict with another 
theme of the legal system: the due process right of redress for in-
jury.265 No constitutional provision expressly states that there is a 
right of redress in the courts, and the Supreme Court repeatedly has 
allowed such a right to be limited or altered.266 However, the Court 
explicitly has stated that statutes which limit access to the courts 
must provide some alternative means of redress for injuries.267 
In Gibbes v. Zimmerman, the Court upheld a South Carolina stat-
ute that prohibited the institution of legal actions against a bank 
without the consent of the Governor.268 The Court noted that individu-
als have no constitutionally protected property interest in any par-
ticular remedy, and that the challenged statute provided a procedure 
that guaranteed creditor interests no differently than individual 
suits.269 The Court went on to state, however, that the Due Process 
Clause required some remedy for the redress ofwrongs.27o Individuals 
are "guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment ... the preservation 
of [a] substantial right to redress by some effective procedure."271 The 
admonition had been noted several times before, for example in Crane 
v. Halo.272 The Court in Crane stated, "No one has a vested right in 
any given mode of procedure ... and so long as a substantial and 
26.3 See id.; Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977). 
264 Moore, 431 U.S. at 503; Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672-73. 
265 See Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933). 
266 See, e.g., Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929). 
267 Gibbes, 290 U.S. at 332. 
268 Id. at 329-30. The statute applied under particular emergency circumstances, while the 
state was in control of the bank. Id. 
269Id. The Court therefore rejected petitioner's due process challenge to the statute. Id. 
27°Id. at 332. 
271 Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly, Gibbes and its kin are rarely cited in recent times. 
However, they have never been explicitly overruled or otherwise discredited. 
272 258 U.S. 142, 147 (1922). 
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efficient remedy remains or is provided due process of law is not 
denied by a legislative change."273 
The requirement of some means of redress presumably underlies 
the Court's inquiry into whether or not statutes provide for a reason-
able substitute to the altered common law remedies.274 Thus, the 
Court in New York Central Railroad v. White relied on the fact that, 
even though injured employees lost their right to sue in tort, the 
statute guaranteed a reasonable compensation.275 Because the statute 
provided some means of redressing workplace injuries, the restriction 
on the right to sue was "not placed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
beyond the reach of the law making power of the State."276 Statutes 
that remove common law protections and leave individuals subject to 
injuries that cannot be remedied may consequently run afoul of the 
Due Process Clause.277 
D. Summary 
The Court scrutinizes due process challenges to common law re-
strictions with greater scrutiny than the highly deferential "arbitrary 
273 [d. (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 
U.S. 437, 439 (1903) ("substantial or efficacious remedy" must remain or be given when statutes 
alter existing remedies); Ritzholt v. Marsh, 105 F.2d 937, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1939). 
274 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87-92 (1978); 
New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,201-03 (1917). 
275 New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 201-03. 
276 [d. at 202; see also Duke, 438 U.S. at 92-93 (ensuring that victims of a nuclear accident 
would be compensated for injuries, and therefore their common law rights to sue could be 
restricted without offending Due Process Clause). 
277 Gibbes, 290 U.S. at 332; see also Honda v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2342 (1994). In a 1994 
decision, the Court in Honda found that an Oregon statute prohibiting judicial review of punitive 
damage awards violated the Due Process Clause. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2339-41. Judicial review 
of punitive damage awards, stated the Court, is a procedural protection against arbitrary or 
unfair deprivations of property. [d. The prevention of such arbitrary deprivations, stated the 
Court, is the very purpose of the Due Process Clause. [d. at 2342. Abrogating this traditional 
procedural protection consequently violated due process. [d. This outcome raises the possibility 
that the line between procedure and substance, when applied to the common law, is blurred. 
See id. at 2338-42. Common law rights and remedies are procedures, but legislation altering 
those rights and remedies is by definition substance. See Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 
155 (1913) (matters of remedy for substantive rights are procedural issues). In Honda, the Court 
applied neither the rational basis standard, strict scrutiny, nor the balancing test articulated in 
Matthews v. Eldridge used to determine what process is due. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2339-42; see 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1975); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance 
and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 85 (1982) (substance and procedure are two aspects 
of same phenomenon). This topic is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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and capricious" test utilized in economic regulation cases.278 Instead, 
the Court considers a variety of factors to ensure that the challenged 
statute is reasonable and fair, and that individuals are not unneces-
sarily left subject to uncompensable harms.279 The Court has never 
explicitly stated that common law change merits a higher standard of 
due process review.280 Nonetheless, the "reasonableness balance" used 
by the Court reflects a number of important judicial concerns, such 
as natural justice, history and tradition, and the right to redress 
injuries by some effective procedure.281 These major themes of the law 
provide some possible explanations why courts inquire more closely 
into statutory alterations to the common law. 
VII. APPLICATION: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES 
WHICH ABROGATE COMMON LAW PROTECTIONS IN FAVOR OF 
POLLUTION REGULATIONS 
According to the reasonableness balancing test, a court probably 
should find the hypothetical common law abrogation statute posited 
at the beginning of this Comment to be a violation of the Due Process 
Clause.282 Applying the various factors used by the Court in its bal-
ancing test to the proposed common law bar, the statute appears very 
different than the statutes upheld in Duke and New York Central 
Railroad.283 Moreover, looked at in light of the values and concerns 
which drive the reasonableness balancing test, such as natural justice, 
history and tradition, and the right of redress, the hypothetical stat-
ute offends many of these bases for judicial concern.284 According to 
the standard of review enunciated in Duke, New York Central Rail-
road, and related cases, the hypothetical common law bar probably 
should be considered an unconstitutional deprivation.285 
278 See supra text accompanying notes 81-215. 
279 See id. 
280 See, e.g., Duke, 438 U.S. at 82-94; New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 196-206. 
281 See supra text accompanying notes 221-77. 
282 See supra text accompanying note 27. As noted, Alaska's § 09.45.230 was written too 
incompletely to serve as the model for this analysis because it did not prohibit public nuisance, 
trespass or negligence claims. See id. As such, the statute would probably not hinder substan-
tially claims for compensation resulting from pollution. See id. 
283 See infra text accompanying notes 286-325. 
284 See infra text accompanying notes 326-351. 
285 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 82-94 (1978); New 
York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 196-206 (1917). 
1997] ALASKA'S NUISANCE STATUTE 
A. Applying "Reasonableness Balancing" Review to the 
Hypothetical Statute 
1. Reasonable Alternatives to the Abrogated Mechanisms 
385 
The hypothetical statute provides for no alternative remedial 
mechanism for individuals who have lost common law rights to sue in 
tort.286 In stark contrast to the Price-Anderson Act, the hypothetical 
statute provides no government commitment to compensate land-
owners injured by industrial pollution allowed under pollution regu-
lations.287 Unlike the Workmen's Compensation Law, there is no guar-
antee of a reasonable, albeit reduced, sum of compensation.288 
Pollution regulation alone does not provide a reasonable alternative 
to tort claims because regulation still allows for significant property 
damage in particular circumstances.289 Neither the hypothetical stat-
ute nor the pollution control regulations themselves provide for com-
pensation for harms that occur to third parties by facilities that are 
in compliance.29o Consequently, under the statute affected landowners 
would be left unprotected from pollution-based harms, without any 
mechanism whatsoever to obtain compensation for injuries.291 
The Court never has held that abrogated common law mecha-
nisms must be replaced with some reasonable alternative.292 If 
ever confronted with a case which demands that the Court finally 
resolve this question, it is impossible to predict the outcome.293 
However, even if the Due Process Clause does not in fact demand 
one, a replacement to altered common law remedies weighs in favor 
286 See supra text accompanying note 27. 
287 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 92-93. 
288 See New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 200-02. 
289 See supra text accompanying notes 29-47. 
290 See id. Citizen suit provisions to require government enforcement of pollution regulations 
are of little value to an individual who has been harmed by a facility in compliance with 
applicable standards and seeks compensation. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42. 
291 See id. 
292 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87-88 (1978); 
supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
293 Compare David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1198 n.6 (1992) 
(considering it safe to conclude that the Constitution does not require alternative for abrogated 
rights) with DeGraffenreid, supra note 81, at 320 (noting that Court in Duke had the opportunity 
to decide quid pro quo issue but did not, demonstrating that they do not want to dispense with 
requirement). 
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of a statute's constitutionality.294 The hypothetical statute provides 
none.295 
2. The Existence of Alternative Benefits 
In Duke and New York Central Railroad, the Court balanced the 
restriction on common law rights with new advantages offered by the 
alternative remedy.296 Because the hypothetical statute does not offer 
any replacement to the tort claims it abrogates, no alternative 
benefits of the sort considered in Duke and New York Central Rail-
road are applicable.297 This absence makes it less likely that a court 
would consider the statute to be constitutional.298 
Additional benefits to affected individuals under the hypothetical 
statute could conceivably accrue from the economic or commercial 
advantages of restricted tort actions. A bar on common law damage 
claims potentially could increase profits for local corporations, thereby 
creating jobs for residents, and augmenting tax revenue for the gov-
ernment.299 However, the Court's discussion of "quid pro quo" benefits 
has centered exclusively on the nature and extent of the remedy 
provided for under the challenged statutory compensation scheme, 
and never has extended to the consideration of benefits unrelated to 
the replacement remedy.3°O Moreover, state courts have been wholly 
unenthusiastic about considering such attenuated benefits a sufficient 
quid pro quo for the loss of common law rights.30l 
294 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 87-93. 
295 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
296 Duke, 438 U.S. at 89-93; New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,200-04 (1917). 
297 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 89-93; New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 200-04. 
298 See Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (even if not required, 
a "true quid pro quo" strengthens the statute's constitutionality). 
299 In the case of Alaska's anti-nuisance statute, such economic benefits are rather difficult to 
discern. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.23.450. There is no indication that nuisance suits threatened 
the viability of Alaskan industrial enterprises, or even cut into profits. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 304-10. In fact, only one nuisance suit based on pollution damage was underway in 
the state at the time the statute was passed, and even that was considered quite unusual. 
McGowan Interview, supra note 11. 
300 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 89-93; New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 200-04. 
301 See supra notes 163-84 and accompanying text; Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 
347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ill. 1976) (noting that lower medical costs for all do not provide a cognizable 
quid pro quo for the limitation of medical malpractice awards). 
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3. The Necessity of Barring Private Actions for Pollution Damage 
Rationality review appears to incorporate an inquiry into whether 
or not a challenged alteration to the common law is warranted.302 This 
inquiry is fact specific and the result would depend upon the circum-
stances.303 In Alaska, the anti-nuisance statute did not appear to be 
particularly necessary to achieve any government objective. Unlike 
the demonstrated need for the Price-Anderson Act's limitation on tort 
liability with regard to the development of private nuclear power,304 
there is little evidence that the Alaska nuisance bar was particularly 
necessary to solve a general policy problem.305 Rather, Alaska statute 
Section 09.23.450 appears to have been a legislative boon to one po-
litically well-connected corporation-the Alaska Pulp Corporation-
to escape a particular lawsuit for property damage.306 
At the time the Alaska legislature passed Section 09.45.230, private 
nuisance actions in Alaska were extraordinarily infrequent.307 The 
statute's proponents could not point to any indication that nuisance 
suits for pollution damage impacted the profitability of Alaskan indus-
try.308 As a result, Section 09.23.450 appears to deprive individuals of 
their common law protections without any demonstration that the 
deprivation was warranted.309 According to the Court's analysis in 
Duke, a deprivation of a traditional right that is not necessary may 
be irrationa1.310 
302 See supra text accompanying notes 166-90. 
308 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 84. Thus, rather than examine the abstract hypothetical statute 
against a non-existent factual background, the necessity inquiry will be applied to Alaska's 
§ 09.45.230. 
304 Id. 
305 See Bill Would Muzzle Pollution Lawsuits, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Apr. 21, 1994, at 1 [herein-
after Bill Would Muzzle]. 
306 See Sept. 22 Order, supra note 15, at 4 n.6 (noting that an "important" purpose of the statute 
was to extinguish the lawsuit brought by Larry Edwards and his neighbors). 
307 See supra note 299. In fact, the Edwards nuisance suit against APC came as a total surprise 
to the local legal community. McGowan Interview, supra note 11. 
308 See Bill Would Muzzle, supra note 305, at 1. According to Senator Robin Taylor, the 
representative who shepherded the anti-nuisance bill through the Alaska legislature, he intro-
duced the bill to prevent environmental activists from blocking new development. Dirk Miller, 
AG Questions Bill on Nuisance Suits, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Mar. 10, 1994, at 1. Taylor referred to 
opponents of his bill as "eco-loonies." Id. 
309 See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(noting that precedent demonstrates that "core" common law rights cannot be abrogated 
without a showing of compelling necessity or a reasonable replacement). 
310 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978). Under 
the hypothetical statute, however, circumstances could demonstrate a need for some common 
law bar. Id. If private industry were struggling under the burden of multiple common law suits 
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4. Likelihood of harm 
The nature and application of pollution regulations allow permissi-
ble industrial activity to seriously damage property.3ll Consequently, 
individuals under the hypothetical common law bar are subject to 
substantial risk of property damage without any mechanism to com-
pensate for those harms.312 In Duke, the Court determined that the 
risk of such an accident was so infinitesimally small that limiting tort 
liability seemed reasonable.313 In contrast, harm to landowners where 
industries are bound only by statutory regulations appears far more 
likely.314 This elevated risk may consequently raise due process con-
cerns.315 
Moreover, the hypothetical statute could increase the likelihood of 
pollution-based injuries to property.316 Presumably, the threat of pri-
vate tort actions encourages industries to restrain pollution beyond 
the level of compliance with pollution standards.317 The statute re-
moves these incentives for industrial managers to reduce potentially 
damaging pollution.3ls As a result, the abrogation of private tort reme-
dies potentially increases the likelihood of harm.319 
The Court in Duke did not quarrel with the District Judge's conclu-
sion that the increased likelihood of harm caused by the Price-Ander-
son Act rendered it violative of due process.320 The Court simply 
disagreed that the Act would increase that likelihood.321 The factors 
noted by the Duke Court, that the integrity of the permitting process 
remained unchanged and that the threat of bankruptcy obviated any 
potential decrease in care, are inapplicable to the hypothetical stat-
ute.322 The integrity of the permitting process is irrelevant because 
for damages caused by pollution, a reviewing court could potentially find that a common law bar 
is necessary to the reali2ation of a government purpose. [d. Of course, necessity is only one of 
several factors to be considered in the reasonableness balancing test. See supra note 123. 
311 See supra text accompanying notes 29-47. 
312 See supra text accompanying notes 39-42. 
313 Duke, 438 U.S. at 86-87. 
314 See supra text accompanying notes 29-47. 
315 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 86-87. 
316 [d. at 87. 
317 See PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 34, at 109-12. 
318 See supra text accompanying notes 39-42. 
319 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 87. 
320 [d.; see Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 
203,223 (W.n.N.C. 1977) ("[T]he tendency of such low ceiling [sic] is to diminish rather than to 
heighten steps necessary to protect the public and the environment."). 
321 Duke, 438 U.S. at 87. 
322 See id. 
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pollution-based harms to property can still occur under allowable 
emissions.323 The risk of bankruptcy, an applicable consideration 
where the harm risked is a nuclear catastrophe, is not a concern where 
the harm is property damage to others caused by continuing air and 
water emissions.324 According to the Duke Court's reasoning, a statute 
that actually makes uncompensable injury more likely would impli-
cate due process concerns.325 
B. Examining the Hypothetical Statute in Light of the Concerns 
Underlying the Reasonableness Balance 
Under the specific factors balanced by Duke and its legal kin, the 
hypothetical common law abrogation statute probably would fall short 
of meeting the due process requirement of reasonableness.326 Exam-
ining the statute from the perspective of the legal themes that under-
lie those factors, the reasons for its likely unconstitutionality become 
more apparent.327 By allowing politically influential corporations to 
damage or destroy private property without any mechanism for com-
pensation or remedy, the statute violates fundamental notions of fair-
ness and justice.328 By eliminating literally ancient common law rights 
with nothing in their stead, the statute offends the tradition due 
process is designed to protect.329 Furthermore, by eliminating every 
avenue of remedy for injuries to property, the hypothetical statute 
deprives individuals of their due process right to redress.33o Conse-
quently, the hypothetical statute offends many of the concerns that 
drive the Court's reasonableness balance review and further demon-
strates why the statute should fail that review. 
323 See supra text accompanying notes 29-47. Even if the permitting and regulatory process 
of pollution control is flawless, the real issue is that permissible pollution can still damage 
property. Id. 
:l24 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 87. To the contrary, an industry would probably benefit economically 
from the opportunity to pollute without being forced to compensate third parties for harms 
which result from that pollution. See PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 34, at 109-12. 
325 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 87. 
326 See supra text accompanying notes 286-325. 
327 See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93-94 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
concurring); Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 
U.S. 188,202 (1917). 
328 See supra text accompanying notes 221-44. 
329 See supra text accompanying notes 245-64. 
330 See supra text accompanying notes 265-77. 
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1. Natural Justice and Fairness Concerns 
A statute which licenses politically powerful industries to damage, 
and even destroy, private property while providing no means of re-
dress to its owners implicates the Court's implicit but ubiquitous 
concern with generalized issues of fundamental fairness and natural 
justice.331 Uncompensable harm in these circumstances likely would 
strike many people as a basic outrage, an affront to the concept of 
"ordered libertY,"332 and would conflict with the Court's multi-factor 
inquiry into reasonableness.333 The inquiry into necessity, alternative 
remedial mechanisms, other benefits and the risk of harm ultimately 
ensures that a common law abrogation is fair.334 
The hypothetical statute "fails" many or even all of the reasonable-
ness balancing factors.335 Moreover, the statute seems unfair in other 
respects. For example, the Court may be treating common law altera-
tions differently depending on whether or not participation in the 
altered scheme is consensuaJ.336 Participation in the hypothetical stat-
ute's liability limits would not be consensua1.337 The bar would apply 
regionally; affected individuals would have to either participate or 
move to a different area.338 The statute would therefore remove the 
common law protections of a captive audience.339 The cases, however, 
331 See supra text accompanying notes 245-64; see also New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 202. 
The rather seedy tale of the passage of Alaska's § 09.23.450-and the role of powerlul private 
interests in the legislative process-supplements the egregiousness ofthat statute's effects. See 
supra text accompanying notes 1-19. 
332 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1947)). 
333 See supra text accompanying notes 81-215. 
334 See New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 202. 
335 See supra text accompanying notes 286--325. 
336 Compare Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929) (liability limits for guest passengers in 
vehicles) and New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 200-04 (workers accept employment-and hence 
worker's compensation statute-voluntarily) with Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study 
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87-93 (1978) (liability limitation applies equally to everyone). It may 
be possible to distinguish Silver, which used a highly deferential rational basis test, from Duke, 
which employed the reasonableness balancing standard, on the basis of implied consent to the 
common law limit. See Duke, 438 U.S. at 87-93; Silver, 280 U.S. at 122. Moreover, the Silver 
decision, although frequently cited for the proposition that the common law can be changed 
without replacement, never explicitly deals with the due process argument. Silver, 280 U.S. at 
117; see DeGraffenreid, supra note 81, at 317 n.17. Several states have held Silver inapplicable 
to due process challenges to common law restrictions, or have decided that Silver is no longer 
good law. See In re Aircrash in Bali, 684 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Thompson v. 
Hagan, 523 P.2d 1365 (Idaho 1974); McGeehan v. Bunch, 540 P.2d 238 (N.M. 1975); Lakonen v. 
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 538 P.2d 574 (Nev. 1975); Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan. 1974)). 
337 See supra text accompanying note 27. 
338 See id. 
339 See id. 
1997] ALASKA'S NUISANCE STATUTE 391 
suggest that non-consensual common law alterations are subject to 
stricter due process scrutiny.340 
While the Court has considered natural justice and fairness con-
cerns to discern "fundamental" interests,341 these concerns are appar-
ently equally applicable to other rights.342 Not only does the statute 
conflict with most of the factors used to ensure reasonableness and 
fairness, but the statute "feels" unfair and unreasonable in a way that 
the Price-Anderson Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act do 
not.343 
2. Due Process Limits as a Reflection of History and Tradition 
Some common law protections and remedies represent traditions 
and mechanisms which stretch back to the very origins of the legal 
system.344 Common law actions in private nuisance, for example, de-
veloped in medieval England and have been used without interrup-
tion for hundreds of years.345 As such, common law property protec-
tions are presumed to reflect a "profound judgment" as to how the 
law should be administered.346 According to the Supreme Court, rights 
that have long been recognized and respected are entitled to greater 
due process protection than rights without such long-standing accep-
tance.347 The greater the basis in tradition and history for a particular 
right or interest, the less enthusiastic the Court will be about seeing 
it abrogated by statute without reasonable alternatives or other 
trade-offs.348 
3. The Due Process Right of Redress 
The hypothetical statute restricts common law rights to sue 
for damages without leaving any alternative mechanisms in their 
340 Duke, 438 u.s. at 63-64. 
341 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-501 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
342 See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,203 (1917). 
343 Compare supra text accompanying note 27 with Duke, 438 U.S. at 63-64 and New York 
Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 200-04. 
344 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 957-58 (3rd ed. 1993) (citing 
William Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 5Th, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.E. 1611». 
345 Id. 
346 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1964) (majority opinion rests protection of 
privacy in marriage context on tradition); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970). 
347 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977); see also Pruneyard 
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 94 n.3 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
348 See Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 94 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
392 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:2 
stead.349 Landowners whose property has been damaged by pollution 
within regulated standards consequently have no remedy at law 
either for injunctions or compensation.350 According to the Supreme 
Court in Gibbes v. Zimmerman, such an absolute loss of a right of 
remedy may directly violate the Due Process Clause.351 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
By using a multi-factor balancing test to examine statutory altera-
tions to common law rights, the Court appears to demand that com-
mon law abrogation be reasonable and fair. The Court's treatment of 
this issue fits uncomfortably into the traditional substantive due proc-
ess dichotomy of arbitrary and capricious review for economic regu-
lation, and strict scrutiny for laws which restrict fundamental inter-
ests. Whether the Court's reasonableness and fairness review 
represents some implicit intermediate standard of review, or rather 
a more substantive conception of ''rationality,'' however, remains unclear. 
If this proposed reasonableness balancing standard is accurate, 
then legislatures may not be able to abrogate common law mecha-
nisms such as nuisance and trespass in favor of existing statutory 
pollution control machinery. Unless pollution standards incorporate 
some mechanism to compensate individuals injured by polluting facili-
ties, and unless the common law alteration can be shown necessary to 
some important goal, such statutes probably violate the due process 
protections of the 14th Amendment. 
Moreover, the substantive component of the Due Process Clause is 
a dynamic, evolving concept.352 Thus, even if a court were to disagree 
that the Due Process Clause has historically demanded a higher level 
of scrutiny where traditional protections are legislatively abrogated, 
there is no reason why such scrutiny could not be applied now.353 Due 
process review has changed drastically over the last ninety years, 
from a powerful tool used to strike down legislation deemed unwise,354 
349 See supra text accompanying note 27. 
350 See supra text accompanying notes 20-47. 
351 See Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933). 
352 See Pennock, supra note 229, at xx. 
363 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530-31 (1884). The Court in Hurtado noted that 
"[t]he Constitution of the United States was ordained, it is true, by descendants of Englishmen, 
who inherited the traditions of English law and history; but it was made for an undefined and 
expanding future .... " Id. Due process is to be determined by a "gradual process of judicial 
inclusion and exclusion." Id. at 534. 
354 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
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to the opposite pole of extraordinary deference,355 and most recently 
to a mechanism for judicial protection of fundamental rights.356 Due 
process evolves to meet the changing needs of society and evolving 
notions of fairness and justice.357 If the Due Process Clause does not 
currently protect private property from damage by politically well-
connected corporations and their allies in local legislatures, perhaps 
it should. 
355 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1923). 
356 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
357 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (The scope of application 
of constitutional guarantees "must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions 
which are constantly coming within the field of their operation"); Miller, supra note 50, at 3; see 
also Pennock, supra note 229, at xx (describing how values shift from a strong belief in 
laissez-faire to faith in necessity of government regulation was reflected in courts' interpretation 
of due process in first half of this century). 
